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INTRODUCTION
"[T]hou knowest .. .what are a mother's rights, and how much the
stronger they are, when that mother has but her child and the scarlet
letter! Look thou to it! I will not lose the child! Look to it!"
Hester Prynne
"[S]till better, it may be, to leave the mystery as we find it, unless Provi-
dence reveal it of its own accord. Thereby, every good Christian man hath
a title to show a father's kindness towards the poor, deserted babe."
Reverend John Wilson'
The presence of illegitimate children has traditionally outraged
society.2 Draconian methods have long been popular to force mothers
of illegitimates to identify their "partners in sin." Hester Prynne's New
England continued the English practice of using the psychological and
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1. N. HAWTHORUNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 140, 143-44 (1929 ed.).
2. WXhy bastard? wherefore base?
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous and my shape as true,
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?
WN'ho in the lusty stealth of nature take
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed,
Go to the creating a whole tribe of fops,
Got 'tween asleep and wake?...
Now, gods, stand up for bastards!
(Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, scene ii)
See generally H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAV AND SOCIAL POuCY (1971).
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physical pressures of labor to induce the mother to disclose the father's
identity. 3 The punishment inflicted on the mother for her illicit sexual
activity was partially justified by the benefits accruing to the child.
While the approach has been refined, the moral outrage remains, con-
veniently disguised by the rationale of fiscal responsibility. In Con-
necticut, a woman who gives birth to an illegitimate child is required
by law to disclose the name of the father. If she is receiving welfare,
the caseworker will refer her to a private attorney. The attorney, in
order to get paid, must either produce the name of the putative father,
or bring the mother before the Circuit Court. Once in court, a woman
who refuses to disclose may be cited for contempt, an offense punish-
able by a fine of $200, a year in jail, or both.4 This article focuses upon
Roe v. Norton,5 a recent three-judge court decision, currently before
the Supreme Court, which upheld such purportedly benevolent in-
3. E.S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 130-31 (rev. ed. 1966). Standard practice was
for Justices of the Peace to wait outside the delivery room for the midwife to obtain a
putative father's identity while a woman was in labor. Such identification during the
woman's travail was presumptively accurate. This practice was based on the English
model, which is discussed by Gail Marcus, Ph.D. candidate, Yale, in an unpublished
manuscript available from the author.
4. The statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-440(b) (1972) reads:
Compelling disclosure of name of putative father and institution of action. (a) If
the mother of any child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any child born to
any married woman during marriage which child shall be found not to be the
issue of the marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree of any court of
competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to disclose the name of the putative father
of such child under oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is a recipient
of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in which such child resides, if
such child is a recipient of general assistance, or otherwise to a guardian or a
guardian ad litem of such child, such mother may be cited to appear before any
judge of the circuit court and compelled to disclose the name of the putative
father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said
child. (b) Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a judge of the
circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails to appear or fails to disclose or fails
to prosecute a paternity action may be found to be in contempt of said court and
may be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
one year or both.
While Connecticut mentions a recoupment interest, its emphasis at oral argument
below and in its Supreme Court Brief was on the state's benevolent interest. See, e.g.,
Brief of Appellee at 1:
The statute seeks the disclosure from mothers of the identity of the fathers of
their children in an effort to protect the welfare of children. The purpose of the
statute is to aid the state in its comprehensive scheme to protect the interest of
children, which is of a paramount interest to the State of Connecticut.
5. The case was originally filed as Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1973),
consolidated with Roe v. Norton and decided at 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973). The
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and granted appellants' motion to proceed in
forma pauperis sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 415 U.S. 912 (1974). The children of the appel-
lants, for whom counsel was appointed by the lower court sua sponte, were also given
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quiry against the constitutional and statutory attack launched by
mothers of illegitimates and the illegitimates themselves.
Roe raises two basic questions:
1) Under what circumstances may the state intervene either
to have adjudicated or itself decide that a child's best in-
terests conflict with traditional parental authority?
2) Assuming the propriety of state intervention, what pro-
cedural protections must be afforded and what are the con-
stitutional limits upon factual or legal presumptions?
Connecticut claims a long-range interest in aiding the illegitimate
child financially and psychologically. But the state's pecuniary recoup-
ment rationale and a history of recent attempts to punish nondisclosing
mothers and their children undercut this benevolent interest. The
disproportionate "civil" sanction authorized by the statute underscores
the clumsiness of the 1971 Legislature's response to judicial negation of
its prior attempts to obtain the names of fathers of illegitimates. Roe
emphasizes the importance of judicial scrutiny of the practical effects of
claimed benevolence. 6
Analytically, it is useful to consider the young7 illegitimate child's
interests separately from those of the non-disclosing mother. Indeed,
there is an ironic cyclical quality to the state's inquiry: the very process
of investigation invades the child's interest in the privacy of the fun-
damental parent-child relationship.
Mothers, children and the state make competing assertions about
the extent to which claimed state beneficence may impinge on tradi-
tional parental prerogatives. In resolving the diffcult trilemma, tie
Court could clarify-or further complicate-significant constitutional
issues concerning the welfare of children.
Without hazarding predictions, this article %vill suggest possible
utilization of Roe v. Norton for further development of such currently
fashionable constitutional theories as the wounded but still viable
"new" equal protection; the changing judicial perception of minimal
procedural due process; the curious admixture of the old bogeyman
leave to proceed in forina panperis, 417 U.S. 943 (1974), and were granted time for oral
arguments, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 170 (1974).
6. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 3S7 U.S. 1, 15
(1967) (judicial scrutiny piercing the veil of governmental beneficence).
7. The relevant statute of limitations is three years from birth or from ce%%atlon of
contribution, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52435(a) (1972), which may be extended by the
putative father's absence from the state for up to seven years, CONN. GE,. STAT. REv.
§ 52-590 (1972).
1974]
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substantive due process, irrebuttable presumption per se and possible
irrebuttable presumption "plus" analysis; the mercurial family privacy
and related freedom of association doctrine; and the possibility of a
constitutional right to refuse to provide the desired information. The
case also involves the difficult issue of properly classifying contempt
and poses the question of whether statutory sex discrimination can be
so de minimis as to escape review.
While categorizing constitutional issues is usually vital in deciding
cases, it also may obscure. Indeed, faced with such a plethora of sig-
nificant doctrinal implications, the Court might well dispose of the Roe
case without decision on the merits. For example, remand for further
development concerning the statute as applied or remand in light of
disposition of a related case could be considered "passive virtues" in
Roe. Or the Court might find the statute's apparent neutrality as to
welfare and non-welfare mothers abrogated by actual discrimination
between the two groups on the face of the statute.8 Such a distinction
might be held violative of even the old "rational relation" equal protec-
tion. But the Court could use this term's tough Roe to hew important
doctrine from the dense Roe v. Wade9 and Doe v. Bolton10 abortion
decisions and the related In re Gault1 and Wyman v. James12 di-
chotomy concerning state alleged beneficence and child and parental
rights. 13
Whichever theoretical path the Court chooses, it will have diffi-
culty deciding cases like Roe so long as the complex mosaic law of
welfare14 and the peculiarities of three-judge court jurisdiction thrust
8. Non-welfare recipient mothers face the same penalties if cited to court. However,
at oral argument the state knew of no such citation of a non-welfare mother. Tr. at 40-41,
A survey of available court transcripts did not reveal any application of the statute to
non-welfare mothers. In vivid contrast, both the parties' stipulation and the lower court's
interpretation indicate the Welfare Commissioner's uniform practice of citing all mothers
who receive state welfare. See note 60 infra. The record reveals no instance of a mother
receiving town welfare; analogous town policy is thus unknown.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
11. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
13. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of
Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971) for a good description of the dichotomy
but a rather ambivalent attempt to accommodate the opposing interests. The Court could
also utilize Roe v. Norton to elucidate its willingness to defer to data obtained from other
disciplines. See, e.g., deference to medical experts in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 645-47 & nn. 12 and 14 and throughout Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and, particularly, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
14. Second Circuit Chief Judge Kaufman called the public assistance area "as com-
plex a legislative mosaic as could possibly be conceived by men," City of New York v.
Richardson, 473 F. 2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lavine v. Lindsay, 412
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complicated welfare cases before the Court without benefit of adequate
records or intermediate appellate development. The Court must find
answers not only to the general riddle of welfare law but also to the
question of how far a modem state may go in abrogating parental
authority and what, if any, justifications make such governmental in-
trusion constitutionally palatable.
This article will first analyze the lower court's decision uphold-
ing the statute. It will then discuss a more refined statutory analysis
and various constitutional theories available to the Supreme Court but
ignored or mishandled below. The article suggests possible utilization
of Roe as a springboard for constitutional development of existing doc-
trine protecting family self-definition. Whatever the resolution of the
Roe case, the profound doctrinal problems it poses are sure to recur as
society begins to alter its outraged, moralistic response to illegitimates
and their parents.
THE LOVER COURT DECISION
The three-judge court decision, written by District Judge Blumen-
feld for himself and Circuit Judge Timbers with a separate concurrence
by District Judge Newman, exemplifies the failings of three-judge
courts as judicial institutions.15 Considerations of efficiency precluded
taking live testimony. The record is full of factual uncertainties and last
minute legal theories unfamiliar even to opposing counsel. Neither the
implementation of the challenged statute nor its practical effect was
ever clearly articulated. Some questions were not raised; others were
entirely muddled both in oral argument and in the court's decision.
Such important issues as the position of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (hereinafter HEW) on the statutory issues and
U.S. 950 (1973). As long as Congress continues to add pieces to the mosaic, the Roe buck
will continue to stop before the seers of the Supreme Court.
15. The Supreme Court recently reiterated its dissatisfaction with three-judge court
review in Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, - U.S. _ 95 S. Ct.
289, 294-95 (1974). See generally Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitu-
tional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1964). The three-judge court institution has long
been the subject of vehement criticism and frequent, thus far unsuccessful, attempts at
reform or abolition. See, e.g., Symposium, Should the Appellate Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court be Changed: An Evaluation of the Freund Report Proposals, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 878, 893-96 (1974); Oakes, Foreword: The Three-Judge Court and
Direct Appeals to the Second Circuit, 48 ST. Jotw's L. REv. 205 (1973); "Freund Com-
mittee," Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the
Supreme Court, reported at 57 F.R.D. 573, 596 (1972) (advocating abolition of three-judge
courts in most cases); Annerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They Run, 52 F.R.D. 293
(1970).
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whether there had been any application of the statute to non-welfare
mothers were left in limbo. Problems of actual practice under the
statute, including such basic issues of due process as availability of
counsel and individualized hearings, were not presented to the
court. 16 The court never analyzed the possibly punitive aspects of §
52-440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which followed two
previous attempts by Connecticut to accomplish the same end, both of
which had been judicially invalidated.
Connecticut first attempted to force disclosure by excluding chil-
dren themselves from Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) eligibility. That effort was enjoined by a three-judge court on
grounds of conflict with the federal statute.1" Connecticut then tried
unsuccessfully to circumvent-the injunction by excluding the recalcit-
rant mothers.18
When the plaintiffs in Roe sought preliminary relief, Judge
Blumenfeld agreed that their constitutional claims were sufficiently
substantial to warrant convening a three-judge court.' 9 However, he
dismissed their "facile" equal protection and due process claims in a
single sentence 20 and determined that the balance of hardship would
not permit injunctive relief because "these children stand to reap sig-
nificant benefits if paternity is established."-21 A similar challenge be-
fore Judge Newman was consolidated and Judge Newman, sua sponte,
took the important step of appointing separate counsel for the children.
The distinct interest of the illegitimate children themselves was ac-
knowledged in the subsequent designation of separate mothers' and
childrens' subclasses for class action purposes. 22
Addressing the statutory argument, the three-judge court found
no direct conflict between Connecticut's statute and the AFDC
16. See, e.g., Tr. at 36, 40, 52. A copy of the transcript is on file with the Connecticut
Law Review.
17. Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488,
rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 (1970). Connecticut's attempt to exclude children from
AFDC benefits if their mothers refused to disclose was held to be an additional "con-
dition of eligibility" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1974).
18. Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 399 U.S. 902 (1970) (the acting welfare commissioner was held in contempt
for attempting to circumvent the Doe v. Shapiro injunction). See 365 F. Supp. at 72 n. 8
for cases following the rationale of these two earlier Connecticut decisions. Ironically,
Judge Blumenfeld participated in both earlier decisions.
19. 356 F. Supp. at 203. See generally Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Coosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
20. 356 F. Supp. at 204.
21. Id. at 207. Judge Blumenfeld never identified these significant benefits.
22. 365 F. Supp. 65, 69.
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program's "paramount goal" of protecting dependent children.2 3 It was
held to comport with a 1967 amendment which required states to
establish programs to aid collection of support payments. 24 Further, a
recent Supreme Court decision was read to allow all but " 'direct and
positive' conflict" between state and federal statutory provisions.25 The
court held § 52-440(b) specifically distinguishable from the previously
invalidated Connecticut disclosure attempts because it did not impose
an additional condition of welfare eligibility.2 6 The court did not dis-
cuss possible conflict with the federal statute's basic general purpose of
protecting dependent children.
The lower court's general response to plaintiffs' constitutional ar-
guments was to reject "the legal semantics in which they have dressed
their particular views about morality, propriety, and psychology." 27
Judge Blumenfeld willingly suspended disbelief as to the accuracy of
the state's views on these very issues. Without explanation, the court
rejected unrebutted expert testimony emphasizing the harmful effects
of the statute. 28 This oversight alone may merit reversal on the
basis of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
23. Id. at 71. The "paramount goal" of protecting dependent children was articulated
in Chief Justice Warren's important initial AFDC decision, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968), striking down Alabama's "substitute father" rule. See also Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 318 (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(17)(A)(i) and (ii) (1974), putting "bite" into the 1950 Notice to
Law Enforcement Officials (NOLEO) provision, 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(1l) (1974). See Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761, 765-67 (D. Conn. 1970) for the legislative context of the 1967
provisions. The 1967 amendment instructed states to develop programs to ascertain
paternity and to secure support for "child[ren] born out of wedlock" as well as deserted
or abandoned children. It compelled program development, but did not compel specific
program format.
25. 365 F. Supp. at 71, citing Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937) in the context
of New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). The Dublino
decision dealt with possible conflicts between the New York Work Rules and the Federal
Work Incentive Program (WIN). This area of possible state-federal conflict may be distin-
guishable, see e.g., Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), prob.
juris. noted, 417 U.S. 943 (1974) (Doc. No. 73-1095). Further, there may be significance in
the Dublino remand to the district court for consideration of specific conflicts notwith-
standing the Supreme Court decision. Id. at 824.
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-440(b) (1972) was distinguished on two grounds.
First, "it does not deny to either the mother or the child the benefits of food, clothing or
shelter in accordance with their needs." 365 F. Supp. at 72. Secondly, it "applies across
the board to all mothers of illegitimate children without regard to their or their children's
status as AFDC recipients." Id. at 73. The inaccuracy of the latter statement is discussed
infra, text accompanying notes 60-67. The irony of the first statement is apparent-the
mother may continue to receive AFDC payments-and prison food, clothes and a cell.
27. 365 F. Supp. at 69.
28. Affidavit of Edward Zigler, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Child
Development Program, Dept. of Psychology, Yale University and forner Head of the
Office of Child Development and Chief of the Children's Bureau, HEW, Roe v. Norton,
19741
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Plaintiffs' claim that the government had to show a "compelling
state interest" was rejected on the grounds that illegitimacy per se was
not a "suspect classification" under the statute, and because no "fun-
damental" interest was affected. 29 The court's presumption, never de-
tailed, was that the statute substantially benefits illegitimates. The
court announced that it would apply the then current, "new" equal
protection test. In fact, the court recast the test into a reiteration of the
newer "rational relation" test, requiring a showing of "some legitimate,
articulated state purpose." 30
In balancing the state's interest against the plaintiffs' claims, the
lower court indicated two distinct state concerns which were commin-
gled throughout its opinion. These were the state's financial recoup-
ment interest and the state's claimed concern for the illegitimates'
well-being. Judge Blumenfeld combined the two without explanation,
perhaps because of an overriding moralistic attitude that a father's
support duty "belongs to a man as a man, and not simply as a member
of civil society."3 ' He rejected without discussion the argument that
the statute distinguished between welfare and non-welfare illegiti-
mates. The court asserted, however, that even if the statute were so
construed, "it is 'rational' that [the state] should take steps to enforce
the prior obligations of [the] father to provide that support" because
the state furnishes public assistance to illegitimates. 32 Plaintiffs' con-
stitutional privacy argument was characterized as "whether an unwed
mother's desire to keep secret the name of her child's father is so
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' as to re-
quire constitutional protection." 33 Having placed the burden of justifi-
cation on the recalcitrant mother, the court limited its discussion to the
broad scope of governmental power to compel testimony in criminal
investigations 34 and the asserted absence of an important 'zone of pri-
Supreme Court Appendix, Doc. No. 73-6033 [hereinafter Rec.] at 125. Deposition of
Albert J. Solnit, M.D., Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry, Director of Child Study
Center and Chairman, Center for the Study of Education, Yale University. Rec. at 62. The
Brief of the Children's Defense Fund as amicus curiae emphatically supports the experts'
arguments and is joined by an impressive list of 27 organizations ranging from the Ameri-
can Academy of Child Psychiatry to the Salvation Army.
29. Familiarity with equal protection doctrine is hereinafter assumed. If the assump-
tion is faulty, see Equal Protection Section and specifically sources cited at note 58 infra.
30. 365 F. Supp. at 78 n. 22. See Equal Protection Section, infra, particularly notes
71-72.
31. Id. at 79 n. 25. See also Judge Blumenfeld's colloquy with Attorney Rosen, coun-
sel for the children, Tr. at 55-59.
32. 365 F. Supp. at 82.
33. Id. at 74 (footnote omitted), citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
34. This power was said to be limited only by relevant immunity considerations and a
quickly-rejected evidentiary privilege claim. Id. at 76.
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vacy' interest. Though Judge Newman questioned the state's rationale
for compelling the mother to prosecute a paternity action as well as to
disclose,35 Judge Blumenfeld's majority opinion made no mention of
the paternity prosecution requirement in § 52-440(b). Curiously, the
irrebuttable presumption-due process challenge was relegated to a
footnote, where Judge Blumenfeld, after analyzing leading Supreme
Court decisions involving irrebuttable presumptions of fact, declared
they had nothing to do with Connecticut's statute. 36 The same lengthy
footnote contained the assertion that the statute was "unlikely" to be
woodenly imposed without regard for impact upon the family. This
unsupported supposition ignored the state's assertion at oral argument
that the statute would be imposed upon all welfare mothers without
any opportunity to litigate its impact.3 7
Having rejected both statutory and constitutional arguments, the
court denied the permanent injunction and dismissed the case. Judge
Newman filed a separate concurring opinion in which he acknowledged
the important privacy right necessarily "implicated"38 in the statute's
compelled disclosure. While stressing that the state's competing in-
terest "might well be insufficient," 39 Judge Newman was able to con-
cur by assuming that critical constitutional balancing would be done by
35. Judge Newman regarded the mother's obligation to prosecute as redundant
"[s]ince the welfare commissioner has authority to prosecute the paternity suit." Id. at 86.
Therefore, he thought the state's interest "might well be insufficient to justify impair-
ment of the constitutionally protected interest she has in making decisions to maintain
the harmony of her family unit." Id. citing Haley v. Troy, 338 F. Supp. 794,804 (D. Mass.
1972).
36. 365 F. Supp. at 79 n.14. If the intended distinction was between presumptions of
fact and presumptions of law, the lack of further elaboration leaves the distinction puz-
zling. Recently invalidated irrebuttable presumptions were presumptions of fact with
direct and conclusive legal effect. The irrebuttable presumption claimed to be imposed
by §52-440(b) similarly presumes facts (that disclosure is always in the child's best in-
terest) and resolves legal questions accordingly. See Irrebuttable Presumption Section,
text accompanying notes 145-74 infra.
37. Tr. at 43-44. The following colloquy occurred between Judge Newman and the
attorney representing the State:
JUDGE NEWMAN: Do you take the position that in a contempt proceeding the
woman has the right to present facts bearing on whether disclosure is in the
child's interest?
MR. HIGGINS: Where the disclosure is in the child's interest?
JUDGE NEWMAN: Can she litigate that issue in the contempt hearing?
MR. HIGGINS: No, I don't believe that she can, under the statute.
JUDGE NEWMAN: Well, when you say the Circuit Court judge will exercise
his discretion, what will he exercise it on if she can't litigate that issue?
MR. HIGGINS: He would litigate it on whether or not she would be held liable
to the imposition of one of the penalties provided.
38. 365 F. Supp. at 84.
39. Id. Judge Newman concurred as to the statute's facial validity "in the precise
sense that not every application of the statute would achieve an unconstitutional result."
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state judges on an ad hoc basis. Presuming that the statute would be
applied with discretion, Judge Newman concluded that the statute was
not facially invalid.
Statutory Arguments
The lower court's statutory analysis was twofold: prior decisions
invalidating earlier Connecticut attempts to compel disclosure were
distinguished because they had imposed additional conditions of wel-
fare eligibility; and New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino40 was interpreted to allow flexibility in state programs absent,
clearcut, direct conflict with the federal statute.
A more fundamental conflict with federal statutory intent was
overlooked by the lower court. The deleterious effect of imposed
separation from the mother upon the very child the AFDC pro-
gram is designed to protect was acknowledged. With marked un-
derstatement, the court conceded the "undesirable effect of dimin-
ishing the amount of time that a recalcitrant mother will be able
to spend with her child" and admitted that "the incarceration of a
contemptuous mother may not always be in the child's best inter-
est."-41 However, Judge Blumenfeld held that "this does not es-
tablish any irreconcilable conflict between the two acts." 42 This
permissive approach to a clearcut conflict with the "paramount goal
of AFDC" was not explained; the court totally ignored the state-
ment of AFDC purpose contained in the Act's introduction. 43 Since
40. New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
41. 365 F. Supp. at 72-73.
42. Id. However, Judge Blumenfeld did not offer guidance in reconciling the Con-
necticut statute and the AFDC federal statutory purpose. Further, his reliance on Justice
Powell's opinion in Dublino alone was overly facile. The New York work rules were
challenged on a claim of federal preemption in the work incentive program area, and it
was this preemption attack which the Court rejected because it found no unambiguous
congressional intent to preempt, 413 U.S. 405, 417 (1973). Stich decisions as Carleson v.
Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) and Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) indicate that
the Court continues to scrutinize state welfare schemes with care and, in some contexts,
places the burden of justifying discrepancies squarely on the states. Dublino does not
represent Supreme Court abdication of its function of comparing federal welfare provi-
sions with conflicting state language typified by King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
For example, Justice Powell's opinion for a unanimous Court in Shea v. Vialpando, 416
U.S. 251 (1974) (striking down Colorado's standardized work expense allowance) demon-
strated that the Court continues to demand flexibility in state programs and indi-
vidualized determinations in accord with federal statutory purpose. Dublino may be
limited to its rejection of the preemption argument. See note 25 supra.
43. The statement of purpose emphasizes the program's primary concern with assist-
ing children in their own homes in the company of their parents. It states:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial
[Vol. 7:1
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King v. Smith,44 the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of home and parent to the development and protection
of the dependent child. The Court recently stated, "The presence
of the parent in the home who has the legal obligation to support is
the key to the AFDC program. -45 Nonetheless, the court below as-
sumed away the inevitable conflict of § 52-440(b) with the federal
statute's primary purpose of aiding families with dependent children
and not separating family units without good cause.4 6
The court accepted Connecticut's claimed authority for its statu-
tory scheme in the 1967 amendment to the NOLEO provisions of the
AFDC statutory scheme, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (17) (A) (i) and (ii). 47 There
is no indication, however, in the almost nonexistent statutory history of
that amendment that it was meant either to alter the AFDC program's
focus on the home and parental care or that anything approaching
Connecticut's harsh enforcement mechanism was foreseen. 48 Further,
the 1967 amendment also contained a specific method to bring "un-
suitable homes" to the attention of the appropriate authorities.4 9 Con-
gress thereby continued to indicate that parental child-rearing deci-
assistance and rehabilitation and other services . . . to needy children and the
parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthn
family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capabilit% for
maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the mainte-
nance of continuing parental care and protection (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. §
601 (1974).
44. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
45. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 603 (1972).
46. Supra note 23. The term "dependent child" is defined a% a need% child "deprived
of parental support" by the absence of one parent. 42 U.S.C. § 606 a t l9741. Cou-
necticut's scheme, purportedly to further assist that child, threatens to absent the remain-
ing parent.
47. Supra note 24.
48. Even the ambiguous bit of statutory history quoted by the louer court. 365 F.
Supp. at 71 n.7, was out of context. If any intent at all can be discerned in the sketchy
legislative discussion prior to passage, it is that the thrust of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee Report was aiding collection of extant support obligations. Overall. there "a" remark-
ably little attention paid to the section in question. Sce. e.g.. S. REP. No. 744. 90th Cong.
1st Sess. 1967 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS at 2837. 2982, 2997.98. Cf. Taylor %.
Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85, 89 n.5-6 (N.D. Cal.), a.f'd vub nom. Carleson v. Taylor, 404
U.S. 980 (1971) (terming 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(17)(Ai) and (ii)*% purpose "tibsertent"
to other AFDC purposes). Once again, the AFDC program is an area in which Congress
"has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to courts to discover the theme in
the cacophony of political understanding." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. .397. 412 19701.
quoted with approval in Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 266 t1974).
49. 42 U.S.C. §602(a) 16 (1974). See also King v. Smith. 392 U.S. .309. 321-24 t l96i,
stressing the abuses of past state "suitable home" program- which eanphatzed parental
morality and Congress' response, 42 U.S.C. §608(a)(i). 'which permitted alteration of the
parent-child home arrangement only if the homne were "judicially determined to hbe
unsuitable as to 'be contrary to the \selfare of such child.' "' Id. at 324.
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sions, even when considered detrimental by the state, could not pro-
duce the automatic governmental overriding of parental authority
which Connecticut's statute compels.
After three-judge court decisions following Doe v. Shapiro were
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, 50 Connecticut alone re-
sponded with yet another, more drastic means to compel disclosure
and paternity suit prosecution. Other states apparently decided they
could devise programs required by the 1967 NOLEO amendment
without threatening mothers with jail and children with lengthy sep-
arations. There is no indication that HEW ever disapproved or even
questioned any of these less restrictive state programs for failure to
conform to the 1967 amendment's prescription. Ironically, Connecticut
submitted its plan to HEW but the record does not reveal HEW
approval, though it is apparently required. 51 Further, though the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly emphasized the desirability of HEW posi-
tion statements in welfare cases, 52 Roe has been thus far decided with-
out the benefit of this administrative expertise.
Finally, both implementation of § 52-440(b) and past Connecticut
practice indicate the danger of violation of the federal statutory com-
mand that a welfare recipient's privacy be protected. 53 The almost
leering judicial attitude prevalent while enforcing § 52-440(b) 54 em-
50. Cited at 365 F. Supp. at 72 n. 8, including, e.g., Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61
(N.D. I1l.), aff'd summarily sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Meyers v.
Juras, 327 F. Supp. 579 (D. Ore.), aff'd summarily, 404 U.S. 803, rehearing denied, ,40,4
U.S. 961 (1971).
51. Rec. at 77-78. (Packard Deposition) indicating that Connecticut submitted the plan
embodied in §52-440(b) to HEW but received no reply; the AFDC "scheme of coopera-
tive federalism," King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968), requires such stibmittal. See
generally National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
52. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970).
53. 42 U.S.C. §60 2 (a)(9) (1974) compels states to "provide safeguards which restrict
the use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes
directly connected with the administration of aid to families with dependent children."
See also 45 C.F.R. §205.50 (1973):
Safeguarding information . . . . A State plan . . . must provide that: . M (1)
The use or disclosure of information concerning applicants and recipients will
be limited to purposes directly connected with the administration of the pro-
gram. Such purposes include establishing eligibility, determining amount of
assistance, and providing services for applicants and recipients.
54. Judicial colloquy with recalcitrant mothers included, e.g.:
THE COURT: Well, when you became pregnant with child....
THE WITNESS: Mmm Hmm.
THE COURT: ... didn't it occur to you that somebody was responsible for that
condition?
THE WITNESS: Oh yes.
THE COURT: And you were concerned, weren't you?
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phasizes the statute's inherent threat to a recipient's privacy and the
difficulty of restricting inquiries even to the broad purposes of the
statute. Past cooperation of Connecticut welfare employees with 3 a.m.
apartment-window searches by police, 55 and other abuses underscore
the danger.
In summary, there are at least two statutory conflicts not ad-
dressed by the lower court, coupled with a questionable resolution of
the conflict it recognized but minimized by simply citing Dublino. The
failure to obtain a statement of HEW's position regarding
Connecticut's statute and the disposition of cases currently before the
Supreme Court concerning HEW's promulgation of a regulation over-
ruling the Doe v. Shapiro line of cases56 could be invoked as grounds
for remand by a Supreme Court anxious to avoid the difficult constitu-
tional problems posed by Roe.57
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Were you?
THE WITNESS: Mmm Hmm.
THE COURT: And did you look for that individual?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: You didn't know who it was?
THE WITNESS: No. You can't look for somebody that I don't know who it is.
THE COURT: And you want the Court to understand that these "several guys-
as you called them, you had relations with and you don't know who they are?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: She was promiscuous to say the least.
Brief of Children of Appellants App. at 36a-38a. See also, e.g., id. at 28a-30a; 22a-24a;
lla-17a; Brief of Children's Legal Defense Fund, App. at 19a-2la.
55. State v. Plummer, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35 (1967) upheld a lascivious carriage convic-
tion based on such a warrantless search, which entailed climbing a fire escape and
shining a flashlight into the defendant's bedroom and was based on a complaint from a
"representative of the state welfare department," id. at 36, that the welfare recipient was
sleeping with a man to whom she was not married. The Appellate Division of the Circuit
Court refused to certify the case for Superior Court review. Id. at 42.
56. Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), prob.juris. noted, 417 U.S.
943 (1974) (Doe. No. 73-1095).
57. Recent passage of a new federal child support collection mechanism, H. R. 17045,
reported at 120 CONG. REC. 12522-12530, may affect the outcome in Roe. While the
statute renders Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 488 (1970) and its progeny inapplicable (Congress specifically made parental coop-
eration a condition of eligibility), its impact on Roe v. Norton is far from certain and may
require a remand. Part of the uncertainty stems from the lack of clarity in the congres-
sional action itself. The Social Service Amendments of 1974 (H.R. 17045) were adopted
on the last day of the 93d Congress amid complaints on the House floor that the Rep-
resentatives had not seen what they were voting on and did not understand the bill's
implications. See, e.g., comments by Reps. Abzug and J.L. Burton at 120 CoNG. IEc.
12585 and 12588-89 (daily ed., Dec. 20, 1974). The bill offers no guidelines as to what
parental cooperation must entail, and its supporters at times contradicted the language of
the bill. See, e.g., the statement by Rep. Pettis, a member of the conference committee.
that "this bill will do more for mothers than is being done now, because te mothers are
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EQUAL PROTECTION
An arbitrary distinction on the face of the statute between il-
legitimates born to mothers receiving welfare and those born to non-
welfare mothers, virtually undiscussed by the lower court, is the
statute's clearest traditional equal protection problem. This facial dis-
tinction based on welfare status is underscored by clear discrimination
in benefits (or burdens) as the statute is applied to the illegitimate
infant. The Court might decide Roe using either traditional "minimal"
equal protection scrutiny58 or an evolving alternative applied in recent
equal protection decisions involving the definition of households.
These decisions require something more than mere rational scrutiny of
governmental purpose when individuals are excluded by statutory
definition from their chosen families or households.
I. Discrimination on the Statute's Face
The lower court should be reversed on equal protection grounds
because of an arbitrary, facially discriminatory classification. Roe in-
volves differing statutory impact, be it burden or benefit, on two
classes of illegitimates distinguished solely by the welfare status of
their mothers.
not going to be denied under this legislation anything to which they have been entitled
up to now." Id. at 12589. While parents will be denied initial eligibility for refusal to
cooperate (§ 402(a)(26)(B)) the bill provides a further incentive of 40 percent of the first
$50 of child support collected monthly during the first 15 months payable to the cooperat-
ing parent (§ 457(a)(1)) as well as federally-funded bonuses to states which aid other
states in enforcing child support orders (§ 458(a)).
The new amendments institute elaborate mechanisms for locating missing parents and
for enforcing state child support orders. The House managers insisted that it would yield
"at least $i billion." E.g., Rep. Ullman, acting chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, at 120 CONG. REC. 12585 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974). Nonetheless, the new
statutory language does not allow measures as harsh as Connecticut's threat of incarcera-
tion to compel cooperation. Accordingly, Connecticut's § 52-440(b) is seemingly in con-
flict with a relatively clear congressional indication of what form compelling cooperation
from a remaining parent to locate a missing parent should take.
By injecting the federal government into the delicate state-dominated child support
area, including utilization of the Internal Revenue Service and the federal district courts
for enforcement, the bill produced opposition from President Ford who, though he signed
the bill, was reported to wish to propose legislation to alter it. The Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 6, 1975, at 14, col. I (a story which described the child-support section as something
"slipped into the bill" by the Senate Finance Committee).
58. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) and Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969) for comprehensive
analysis of equal protection theories and the development of newer criteria for judicial
measurement. Cf. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
[Vol. 7:1
THE ILLEGITIMATE
The discrimination is best illustrated by assuming arguendo the
reasonableness of the state's benevolent justification that disclosure is
in the best interest of all children. Under Connecticut law, the mother
of an illegitimate child under 18 years old is the sole guardian. s 9 If the
mother is receiving welfare, the state need not remove her guardian-
ship to compel disclosure since the Welfare Commissioner is autho-
rized to require revelation. In fact, the parties stipulated that it is the
statute's intent and the welfare agency's uniform practice to compel
disclosure "in each and every case." 60 However, to gain the statute's
claimed benefits, the child of a non-welfare mother must overcome
procedural barriers and the further hurdle of merely discretionary ac-
cess. Only a guardian or guardian ad litem may compel a non-welfare
mother to disclose. The non-welfare child's statutory benefits thus de-
pend on having someone meet the weighty burden of convincing a
court to remove the mother's guardianship in a judicial hearing replete
with procedural protections for the mother. 61 Even were such a bur-
den met, the newly appointed guardian or guardian ad lit em still
would have discretion to refuse to compel disclosure.
This double discretionary barrier sharply contrasts with the state's
position vis-'a-vis welfare children, for whom Connecticut uniformly
seeks the statute's alleged benefits. If the state's primary justification
for the statute-the child's best interest-is believed, it affords an
almost unprecedented example of statutory discrimination against the
non-welfare group.
Of course, if one assumes the far more plausible contrary
hypothesis-i.e., that the statute often burdens those children it pur-
ports to benefit-then the classification of illegitimates wholly accord-
ing to their mothers' welfare status is even more striking. The twofold
discretionary shield testing the best interests of the particular non-
welfare child contrasts with the uniform treatment the welfare depart-
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-43 (1972). But sec Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340, 307
A.2d 166 (1972) (invoking Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) to question the statute's
exclusive grant of guardianship to mothers of illegitimates).
60. The stipulation stated:
It is the intent of §52-440(b) and the practice of the Connecticut State Welfare
Department in each and every case in which the mother of an illegitimate child
fails or refuses to name the putative father of the child to retain an attorney for
the purpose of citing the mother court [sic] if she persists in refusing to name the
putative father. (Rec. at 56.)
It is unclear how the parties could discern the statute's intent, since there is no available
legislative history, and they cite no supplementary sources. Nevertheless, their percep-
tion was shared by the lower court which stated, "The defendant public official ... is not
only authorized, but required, to proceed under the statute .. " 365 F. Supp. at 80.
61. CoNw. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-43 (1972).
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ment affords welfare children. This distinction is a paradigmatic exam-
ple of the dual family law system identified by the late Professor
tenBroek. 62
The irrationality of the distinction is underscored by the state's
ironic argument that the private attorneys to whom recalcitrant welfare
mothers are referred may exercise discretion not to cite them before a
court. 63 But the attorneys are paid by the welfare department only if
they obtain the putative father's name or if they go to court.0 4
Nevertheless, the court below stressed, "This statute which imposes a
duty upon an unwed mother to disclose the name of the putative father
of her child does not distinguish between unwed mothers who receive
public assistance and those who do not."65 From the child's perspec-
tive however, this is a vital distinguishing characteristic.
Just last term, the Court struck down a similar statutory distinc-
tion among illegitimates in Jiminez v. Weinberger.66 In Chief Justice
Burger's 8-1 majority opinion, the Court emphasized the constitutional
infirmity of the combined under-inclusive and over-inclusive categori-
62. Jacobus tenBroek's seminal study was first published as California's Dual System
of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257,
900, and 17 STAN. L. REV. 612 (1964-65). The entire study was reissued, with minor
changes, as FAmLY LAW AND THE POOR (1971). In language directly relevant, Professor
tenBroek summarized the dual system:
One is public, the other private. One deals with expenditure and conservation of
public funds and is heavily political and measurably penal. The other deals with
the distribution of family funds, focuses on the rights and responsibilities of
family members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal. One is for under-
privileged and deprived families; the other for the more comfortable and fortu-
nate.
16 STAN. L. REv. at 257-58. Lewis & Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies-The Case
for "Dual Systems", 54 CALIF. L. REv. 751 (1966). See also Paulsen, Juvenile Courts,
Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694 (1966); Foster & Freed, Un-
equal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192 (1967).
63. See note 60 supra for the referral procedure. Assistant Attorney General Higgins
argued before the lower court that the attorneys had such discretion. Tr. at 43. Im-
mediately thereafter, however, he conceded that the mother could not litigate whether
disclosure would be in her child's interest at the contempt hearing. Tr. at 44; see note 37
supra.
64. The private attorneys to whom the Welfare Department makes referrals are paid
"$75-if the mother names the father prior to a court hearing" and "$150-if the mother
goes to a full hearing before the court." Rec. at 124. The private attorney is paid only if he
forces the mother to disclose and thus has a direct financial stake. Rec. at 122. This
economic self-interest directly undercuts his function as a disinterested party or one
concerned solely with the child's best interest. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroevllle, 409
U.S. 57 (1972) (trial of traffic violations before mayor whose town was financed from
traffic court proceeds denied due process requirement of disinterested magistrate).
65. 365 F. Supp. at 81. Judge Newman disagreed. Id. at 85-86 n. 2. The state conceded
at oral argument that it knew of no attempted enforcement concerning a non-welfare
mother.
66. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
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zation of illegitimates, as in the Connecticut statute. The lower court in
Roe conceded that welfare children might have their statutory benefits
sought more "assidiously," but regarded this as a permissible remedial
distinction. 67 Connecticut's gross exclusion of non-welfare illegitimates
from its questionable benefits-or protection from its burdens-
stretches the equal protection notion of remedial classification beyond
the breaking point. Even to categorize the statute's effect as remedial
is, of course, to accept its asserted beneficent basis. But the lower
court recognized the much more mundane state fiscal interest in addi-
tionally burdening welfare mothers. This inherently contradictory state
rationale invalidates the assumption that "[t]his statute . . . does not
distinguish between unwed mothers who receive public assistance and
those who do not."
II. How Reasonable is Rational These Days?
Judge Blumenfeld inconsistently asserted "[e]ven if . . . the
statute ought logically to be construed to create a separate classification
affecting only unwed mothers of illegitimate children who receive
some form of public assistance, that particular classification is directly
linked to the public interest the statute is designed to secure. "6 8 That
"public interest" is defined as the state's claimed financial interest.
This assertion underscores the inconsistency of the state's be-
nevolent rationale, and recalls the questionably benevolent origins of
the parens patriae doctrine.6 9 Even minimal equal protection scrutiny
might regard such a claimed state interest as so wholly without factual
67. 365 F. Supp. at 81 n. 29. Judge Blumenfeld compared Roe's alleged benefits to
those discussed in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1966). in which the
granting of benefits to a limited class was permitted. Katzenbach, however. involved a
distinctly different, ameliorative attempt by Congress to increase Puerto Rican voting by
waiving an English literacy requirement for Puerto Ricans educated in Puerto Rico. Sce
Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights. 80
HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966). Mere invocation of "remedial" purpose, however, cannot an-
swer any and all equal protection questions. Further, there may be a subtle form of racial
discrimination in outraged paternalistic responses to the plight of illegitimates. As Profes-
sor Krause argued in his amicus curiae brief in Levy v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and
in ed. WILKERSON, THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGING CONCEPTS IN LAw AND
SocIETY 147 & n. 22 (1973), discrimination against illegitimates often masks discrimina-
tion against blacks.
68. 365 F. Supp. at 82 (footnote omitted).
69. The beneficence of the original parens patriac assumption of decision-making
competence and the less-than-benevolent continuing effects of the rationale have been
critically analyzed extensively in recent years. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1967); Winters v. Miller, 446 F. 2d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E. 2d 109, 117-22 (W. Va. 1974). See generally Cogan,
Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of 'Parens Patriac', 22 S. CAROLINA L. REV.
147 (1970); FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LW 394 11966).
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basis as to be irrational. Connecticut concedes that it has never con-
sidered whether the cost of administering the disclosure requirement
exceeds its potential returns.70 The total absence of legislative history,
combined with past attempts to penalize the classes challenging the
statute and the state's emphasis on conflicting altruistic and self-
interested justifications, compel scrutiny of the statute's rational rela-
tion to either asserted purpose.
The rational relation test set forth by Justice Powell in the equal
protection paroxysm, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,71 ex-
amined a state purpose "to determine whether it rationally furthers
some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination." 72 Although Justice Powell
also indicated during the same term that a legislative purpose need
not be primary to serve as a valid equal protection defense, it must be
"clear and legitimate. "73
The success of a defense asserting the saving of money as in itself a
legitimate legislative purpose is currently much in doubt, particularly
given the patina of punitiveness present in Roe. 74 Further, while the
acceptable legislative purpose need not be primary, in Roe the eco-
nomic rationale may actually conflict with the asserted primary
benevolent purpose. Finally, the state must make some showing that
its purpose, even assuming its "legitimacy," is being "rationally fur-
thered" by the classificatory scheme. 75 Roe presents no record regard-
70. Rec. at 75-76. A 1971 Department of Health, Education and Welfare AFDC Study
found that even among non-institutionalized fathers whose whereabouts were known to
be within the state, approximately two-thirds paid no support whatsoever. HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, FINDINGS OF THE 1971 AFDC STUDY, Part III (De-
partment of Health, Education & Welfare, Pub. No. (SRS) 73-03759, 1973). A more recent
study, with questionable methodology, showed return exceeding expenditures and wa%
relied on during debates on the Social Security Amendments of 1974. See 120 CONG.
REC. 11291-92 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths).
71. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
72. Id. at 17.
73. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973). McGinnis also included the
"articulated" element of the test. Id. at 270.
74. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("the Constitution recognize,,
higher values than speed and efficiency"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1972); City of
New York v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 923, 132 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub non. Lavine v.
Lindsay, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). Cf. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
263 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). See also James v. Strange, 407
U.S. 128 (1972) discussed note 77 infra.
75. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 415 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice Powell reiter-
ated the importance of some governmental showing of rationally furthering its purposes
in his concurrence in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 653 n. 2 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring). See note 156 infra. See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972) (requiring showing of "substantial" interest being fur-
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ing such concerns. The total absence of legislative history undercuts
the "articulated" element of the Rodriguez test. Many unexamined
questions should be considered by a court scrutinizing the rationality
of the statute.7 6 Even if Connecticut's fiscal rationale were convincing,
however, the statute should be overturned because its blight on the
search for "self-sufficiency and self-respect" of welfare mothers and
their infants contains "elements of punitiveness and discrimination
which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the
law." 77
Further, Professor Gunther's suggestion of a "newer" equal pro-
tection With intermediate legislative ends-means scrutiny originated
primarily in decisions protecting family interests and, specifically, the
interests of illegitimates. 78 Although development of Gunther's ap-
proach has been slowed,79 the Court has not explicitly rejected the
thered). Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972). For a provocative critique of
scrutiny of the rationality of state purposes, see Note, Lcgislatice Purpose, Rationality
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). See also cases discussed in text accom-
panying notes 80-96 infra.
76. Such questions might include:
1) Does HEW reimburse Connecticut for its enforcement costs or for tile
salary of the temporary housekeeper Connecticut claims it will supply if a
mother actually goes to jail?
2) How much would jail costs be?
3) Does Connecticut insist on pursuing all mothers even when there is no
potential recoupment possibility, as when the statute of limitations has run?
4) How much does it cost to administer the program? What are the projected
financial returns?
A remand to explore such issues could be in order.
77. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 14243 (1972) (invalidating a Kansas statute allow-
ing recoupment for indigents' legal defense fees without protective exemptions provided
other civil judgment debtors). In James, Justice Powell stated that the state's recoupment
interest might be legitimate, id. at 141, and that even if "misguided" the statute could be
constitutional, because the statute's effectiveness was a legislative matter, id. at 133-34.
However, the statute violated equal protection because the state's financial interest did
not justify the harsh practical effect of its enforcement which undennined other state
goals, and which unconstitutionally separated indigent defendant debtors from all others.
The welfare mothers and their illegitimate children are similarly singled out in Ro' and
treated in a way which undercuts the benevolent goals tile state claims to wish for them.
Even a legitimate state fiscal interest "does not mean, however, that a state may impose
unduly harsh or discriminatory terms merely because the obligation is to the public
treasurer rather than to a private creditor." ld. at 138.
78. Gunther, supra note 58, at 17, 31-33.
79. The Second Circuit opinion in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1973) represented the highwater mark of the new equal protection. Tile Supreme
Court's refusal to follow the Gunther-Second Circuit analysis, reversing in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), may indicate that many an equal protection tier has to
fall before lower courts and commentators understand tile equal protection emanations
from the current Court. See, e.g., Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood %-. Lindsa).
F.2d - n.5, Doe. No. 73-2590 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1974).
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doctrine. The cause of illegitimates with mothers on welfare burdened
and stigmatized by Connecticut's disclosure statute could help revive a
theory floundering in search of a context.
III. Family Self-Definition v. Protecting the Fisc
In a series of directly relevant equal protection decisons, the
Court recently struck down statutes which presumptively excluded
individuals or groups from the family or household units with which
they chose to identify. The decisions all acknowledge or assume
arguendo the rationality and legitimacy of governmental attempts to
protect the fise. Nevertheless, in Stanley v. Illinois,80 United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno8l and Jiminez v. Weinberger,82
the Court required far more than minimal scrutiny83 of attempts to
ignore familial or household bonds by mere definitional exclusion. In
all three cases, the governmental defendant lost because the Court
would not accept thrift as a sufficient justification. 84
Stanley represents the clearest judicial articulation of the impor-
tance of the family unit to an individual. Illinois attempted to exclude
80. 405 U.S. 465 (1972) (striking down an Illinois statute removing the putative father
of illegitimates from the family unit in a dependency hearing less expensive than the
otherwise required neglect hearing).
81. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a statute denying food stamps to households of
unrelated persons despite claimed governmental purpose of reducing fraud).
82. 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating a statute which excluded after-born, unacknowl-
edged illegitimates from Social Security insurance payments).
83. The most minimal scrutiny is best represented by McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Pennsylvania's Sunday Closing Laws by "conceiving" a secu-
lar motive) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a Maryland statu-
tory ceiling on AFDC grants to families regardless of the number of children). In
McGowan, late ChiefJustice Warren stated that "a statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. The
Dandridge majority opinion by justice Stewart stressed the institutional concern that
federal courts not "impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise econnonlc
or social policy." Id. at 486 (footnote omitted). In the area of economics and %neial
welfare, the Court stated that it would allow imperfection in "allocating limited public
welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Id. at 487. This policy basi for
the Court's reluctance to intervene in the Dandridge allocation decisions was en-
phasized by theJihninez Court in distinguishing Dandridge. See text accompanying note
91 infra.
84. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) also fits the general category of judicial scrutiny
of family definition as it conflicts with governmental attempts to save money by utilizing
administrative short cuts via generalization. Because Idaho's probate code automatically
preferred males to females in the same entitlement class, the sex discrimination element
in the case renders Reed explainable on other grounds. See Gunther, supra note 58. at
33-34. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the unanimous Court stressed the
legitimacy of the workload reduction rationale, but found it an insufficient constitutional
justification. Reed, su pra at 76. See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization %.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), discussed at note 92 infra.
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Peter Stanley, the natural father of illegitimate children, from its
statutory definition of parents when adoption was being considered.
Justice White stated for the Court:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the proce-
dure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and
care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference
to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over
the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore
cannot stand.8 5
Illinois could not exclude Peter Stanley from his parental prerogatives
and obligations by definitional fiat. Nor could the child's interest be so
easily overcome. Significantly, the Court recognized both interests and
rejected a statute which foreclosed individualized weighing of "the
determinative issues of competence and care" when family dissolution
was at stake. 86
In Moreno, remarkably analagous to Roe in its lack of articulated
basis for legislation and in its transparently punitive motivation, the
Court emphasized that a legislative desire to harm an unpopular group
could not constitute an adequate governmental interest. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion questioned the federal government's asser-
tion that denying food stamps to households of unrelated persons
would minimize fraud. But even if the Court "accept[ed] as rational
the Government's wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the
differences between 'related' and 'unrelated' households," it was held
necessary to scrutinize the statute's "practical effect. "87 Forcefully ap-
plying the Rodriguez test, albeit without citation, the Court required a
showing by the defendant that the statute operated "so as rationally to
further the prevention of fraud."88 Because of the importance of
household self-definition, the aura of punitiveness and the lack of satis-
factory legislative articulation of goals, the Moreno Court rejected the
money-saving rationale. Remarkably similar elements appear in Roe,
and Connecticut has likewise failed to show or even to consider the
"practical effect" of its differential classification of welfare families.
Last term's delphic decision inJiminez further indicates that mere
minimal rationality is insufficient for governmental classifications uni-
85. 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 657-58.
87. 413 U.S. 528, 535-37 (1973).
88. Id. at 537.
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laterally excluding individuals from their family units. Jiminez involved
a claim to Social Security payments by unacknowledged illegitimates
born after the onset of parental disability. Chief Justice Burger tiptoed
almost imperceptibly between what he recognized as a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest-saving money-and what was held to be a fatal
failure in the "tightness of fit" of the governmental family definition
because of its discrimination among classes of illegitimates.
Jiminez' very ambiguity makes it an attractive precedent for the
Court in Roe. The Court offered neither further equal protection cita-
tion nor analysis beyond quoting extensively from two equal protection
polarities and regarding neither as determinative. 89 Employing recent
irrebuttable presumption language, 90 the Court rejected the rationale
of avoiding spurious claims because, distinguishing Dandridge, the
statutory scheme was not meant "to achieve necessary allocation of
finite resources." 91 Jiminez forbade discrimination in classification be-
tween classes of illegitimates which was both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive. The Roe statute is grossly over-inclusive of welfare
children and arguably under-inclusive for non-welfare children. More
specifically, Connecticut attempts to insulate the welfare child from his
or her mother's discretionary decision to exclude the putative father
from the family. In questioning the mother's competence to make such
a decision, the state should be required, at a minimum, to afford the
welfare child the procedural protections and individualized determina-
tion of best interests it affords other illegitimates. Jiminez' holding
reiterated recent Supreme Court indications that the government has
the burden of justifying lines drawn between classes of children which
significantly harm one class by denying it governmental largesse. 92
89. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). The ambiguity of the decision is described by Justice Rehn-
quist as "a perplexing three-legged stool," id. at 638 (dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
quoted at length from Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1972)
(discussing special judicial concern with the plight of illegitimates), id. at 632, and Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (discussing the inevitability of imperfect
accommodation of state social and economic welfare policies to the particular needs of a
given family), id. at 632-33.
90. Supreme Court scrutiny to determine if "it is necessarily or universally true" that
the discrimination between classes of illegitimates comported with what would be re-
vealed if they were afforded individual hearings, id. at 636, was taken directly, albeit
without citation, from Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1973) in which Chief
Justice Burger vigorously dissented.
91. 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974).
92. The revolution in the rights of illegitimates had its Supreme Court beginnings in
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimates constitutionally enabled to collect for
the wrongful death of their mother) and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (the converse). Its development seemed to be interrupted by
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S, 532 (1971), which upheld intestate succession provisions
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Of course, a private decision to be part of a family does not pre-
clude state imposition of legal duties such as child care and support
and the requirement of divorce before remarriage. Indeed, in Gomez
v. Perez,93 the Court held it unconstitutional for a state to deny some
family members the right to enforce the legal support duties of others.
No analogy to Roe can be drawn, however, because a Gomez right to
the putative father's assistance does not imply a duty to seek it.94
Further, under § 52-440(b) only welfare mothers are forced to seek the
father's assistance.
The Stanley and Jiminez decisions, complementing recognition of
the "illogical and unjust"95 traditional condemnation of illegitimate in-
fants, illustrate increasing judicial solicitude for self-defining family
situations and extensive inquiry prior to allowing governmental
intervention. 96 Deference to family autonomy may help explain the
otherwise confusing series of cases generally concerning the rights of
illegitimates. 97 Statutory presumption and definitional exclusion in
pursuit of efficiency cannot meet even the low-level test of "rationally
denying acknowledged illegitimates equal inheritance rights. Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) followed Levy and distinguished Lobine. justice
Powell's majority opinion invalidated a workmen's compensation law which disadvan-
taged illegitimates. In Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), the per curiam opinion found
a paternal support duty for illegitimates constitutionally required because "a state may
not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally." Id. at 538. The per curiam opinion in New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), continued the trend by in-
validating a New Jersey assistance program for the working poor which "in practical
effect . . . operates almost invariably to deny benefits to illegitimate children while
granting benefits to those children who are legitimate." Id. at 619-20. Connecticutes
statute seems to include just such a "practical effect" if a child's interest in parental
autonomy is considered a "benefit."
93. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
94. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the Court rejected a claim
that the state had an obligation to enforce a child support duty by invoking available
criminal sanctions. The mother of an illegitimate was denied standing in her attempt to
influence prosecutorial discretion. This result, coupled with Comez, should delight
Hohfeldian scholars.
95. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
96. Arguably, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). which upheld a
zoning ordinance forbidding households of three or more unrelated persons, conflicts
with developing judicial solicitude for family or household self-definition. But lack of
discussion of equal protection or freedom of association issues indicates that Boraas is
explainable as a modem example of traditional deference to local zoning police power
with environmental overtones. See note 79 supra.
97. Among the decisions discussed supra note 92, only in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971) had a parent done something which could be interpreted to reflect choice of
exclusion of an illegitimate from the category of "family". Of course, reliance on intestate
succession as an index of conscious choice is distressingly unrealistic; nevertheless, the
assumption of positive parental decision may differentiate Labine from the other recent
Supreme Court decisions concerning illegitimates.
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furthering a legitimate articulated state interest." Surely, scrutiny of
the "practical effect" of Connecticut's statute condemns its blunder-
buss approach.
IV. Facial Sex Discrimination and the De Minimis Defense
The Connecticut statute on its face applies only to mothers who
refuse to reveal the names of putative fathers, and not vice versa. It is
not inconceivable that a mother might give birth and falsify her name
on a birth certificate or deliver at home and desert father and child. 98
Accepting the state's justification for forcing disclosure of the father's
identity, it could be in the child's or the state's interest to obtain the
name of the deserting mother. However, the statute does not aid in
obtaining such "benefits." Deserting mother scenarios echoing Vic-
torian fiction may be rare, but they raise the question of how do
minimis a sex-based discrimination must be to survive judicial scrutiny.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,9 the discriminatory classification affected
fewer than one percent of the relevant population, 100 yet was found to
be unconstitutional. What percentage of deserting parents of illegiti-
mates must be mothers for Frontiero to require reversal in Roe? When
sex discrimination is apparent on the face of a statute, the Court ap-
pears unwilling to ignore even minimal effects absent remedial justifi-
cation. It would be wonderfully ironic if § 52-440(b) were constitution-
ally invalid because it did not allow illegitimates sufficient leverage to
learn their deserting mothers' identities. Yet, to the extent that sex
classification approaches racial classification in "suspectness,"101 such a
possibility must not be overlooked. The Court faces a sex-classification
on the face of § 52-440(b); it must either ignore it or clarify the permis-
sible range of statutory sex discrimination.
98. In Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974), for example, the mother had
deserted her family, leaving the father to care for the illegitimate children. It is perhaps
significant that the recent amendments to the Social Security Act, H.R. 10745, discussed
supra at note 57, use the sex-neutral term "parent" throughout.
99. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
100. Servicewomen affected by the discriminatory method of granting military bene-
fits to dependents constituted fewer than 1 percent of the relevant group. Id at 681.
101. Only four Justices joined in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion that "classifica-
tions based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 411 U.S.
at 688. Justice Brennan also stressed the comparable discrimination suffered by 19th
century women and pre-Civil War blacks under slave codes. Id. at 685, In Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), however, another largely unexplained decision authored by
Justice Douglas cast doubt on the analogy of sex to race in terms of suspect classification
for equal protection purposes. The overt statutory sex classification in Roe would not
survive were it a racial classification, even with minimal practical application. See also
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975).
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Any of four possible due process analyses could be determinative
in this case. The challenged statute is appallingly cavalier in failing to
afford traditional procedural protections. The stipulation that the con-
tempt is civil might be questioned and the lack of protections afforded
the mother found wanting; the traditional procedural due process
model standing alone--or as a vital element in developing irrebuttable
presumption analysis-might condemn the statute; finally, the "new"
substantive due process protection of privacy interests might afford a
basis for decision.
I. Due Process Aspects of Contempt
In a curious stipulation,' 0 2 the parties agreed that § 52-440(b)
provides a civil contempt sanction. The plaintiffs' desire to avoid
Younger v. Harris'0 3 restrictions on their access to the federal courts
explains their agreement to the stipulation. The state probably agreed
because by doing so it thought to avoid difficult due process issues.
However, the parties themselves may not have authority to determine
whether a contempt is civil or criminal.' 0 4 Several elements of the
statute might lead the Court to construe it as criminal according to past
contempt categorization. The fixed maximum penalties, the presence
102. The stipulation (merely noted and accepted by the three-judge court. 365 F.
Supp. at 82 n.31) stated inelegantly, "[Sec.]52-440b in the opinion of counsel for all the
parties is a civil statute. A contempt committed under this section can be purged at any
time, i.e. by naming the putative father, in the opinion of counsel of record herein." Rec.
at 56.
103. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The Supreme Court could use Roe to extend Younger, by terming proceedings against
the mothers "quasi-criminal" or extending Younger to civil cases. See Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 556 (1972) (dissenting opinion). Further extension
of Younger is ill-advised. Since the essence of the children's constitutional claim is
the state court's refusal to consider their interests, remand is pointless. Because the
Connecticut statute threatens the equivalent of arrest, in disregard of the mothers' first
amendment interests, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) and Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) preclude invocation of Younger. Younger's policy of avoiding
state-federal friction would be disserved by compelling state courts to resolve issues
the state wishes the federal courts to decide and which the state may have waived.
104. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (the case cited by the
court below which supports the characterization of a §52-440(b) proceeding as civil). In
Shillitani, the Supreme Court construed the contempt as civil, though the courts below
and the parties had consistently construed it as criminal. Such a uniform mistake among
parties and lower courts underscores the difficulty of any contempt characterization. See
also Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)(stringent
standard of proof prior to deportation though denominated "'civil"); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (fifth and sixth amendment procedural protec-
tions prior to loss of citizenship because of "punitive nature" of sanction).
1974]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
of the state as one of the parties and the punitive underpinning of the
statute are all traditional indicators of criminal contempt. But resolu-
tion of the categorization riddle could require a remand because of its
complexity and its due process ramifications.
Scholarly condemnation of sui generis judicial attempts to distin-
guish civil and criminal contempt is all but universal. 105 A single con-
tempt sentence often contains a punitive component (defining criminal
contempt) and conduct-coercing elements (defining the civil con-
tempt).108 Supreme Court decisions enhancing the procedural protec-
tions accompanying criminal contempt have heightened the practical
importance of correctly isolating the two elements. But this is a nearly
impossible task. Further, the Court has condemned such a "jurispru-
dence of labels" repeatedly in other contexts. 10 7 The right to appointed
105. Perhaps the most outspoken critic of attempts to distinguish civil and criminal
contempts is R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963), particularly at 46-67. For a
more moderate, but still despairing critique of civil-criminal linedrawings updating Gold-
farb see Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971). Professor
Dobbs noted, "[T]he classification scheme breaks down in confusions, and courts are apt
to talk of contempts themselves (rather than the hearings) as criminal or civil ... In short,
the abstract distinctions between civil and criminal contempt have not worked very
well." Id. at 246. See also Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power,
60 CEO. L.J. 1513 (1972); Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion that
Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL, L.
REV. 463 (1966).
106. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 383 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"[O]bviously, a fixed sentence with a purge clause can be said to embody elements of
both criminal and civil contempt." Id. Justice Harlan was, in effect, restating the Su-
preme Court's recognition of the mixed contempt difficulty articulated in its leading
civil-cum-criminal decisions, United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
298-302 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-48 (1911); and
Besette v. W.B. Corkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904). Courts have generally held that
even when a contempt sanction is imposed to coerce action, it is properly classified as
criminal contempt if the state rather than a third party benefits directly from the subse-
quent fine or action. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir. 1946)
(cited by the Supreme Court in Shillitani, supra, at 371 n.7, regarding the distinc-
tion between criminal and civil contempts and the need for procedural protections even
in the civil context); In re Merchants Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 642 (1912).
Ironically, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently discussed the civil/criminal distinc-
tion at length and found that a definite fine imposed upon striking teachers made the
contempt criminal and therefore compelled reversal since the hearing accorded them
lacked adequate procedural safeguards. McTigue v. New London Educ. Assoc., 164
Conn. 348 (1973). Justice Bogdanski, for a unanimous court, found it determinative that
the fines "were punitive, designed to uphold the dignity and authority of the court: they
cannot be classified as remedial or coercive. They were payable to the state of Connect-
icut and not to the plaintiffs." Id. at 355.
107. Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman
v.James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1302 (1971). In N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963), the Court noted, "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by
mere labels." Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934) (upholding a murder
conviction after jury visit to crime scene unaccompanied by accused), in which Justice
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counsel and the less clear-cut right to a jury trial recently have been
decisive factors in a variety of technically civil cases. ' 08
Affixing the civil label in Roe without consideration emphasizes
the arbitrariness of this "Proteus of the legal world."' 0 9 Even if the
parties correctly stipulated that the contempt was civil, however, the
statute might violate fundamental fairness by permitting incarceration
for up to a year without appointed counsel or jury trial.' 10 Recent
decisions support the mother's right to appointed counsel no matter
what the designation of the contempt.
Just last term the Court noted in Taylor v. Hayes the "height-
ened potential of abuse posed by the contempt power," commenting,
[t]he provision of fundamental due process protections for
contemnors accords with our historic notions of elementary
fairness . . . . Due process cannot be measured in minutes
and hours or dollars and cents. For the accused contemnor
facing a jail sentence, his "liberty is valuable and must be
Cardozo decried "the tyranny of labels" as "a fertile source of perversion in constitutional
theory."
108. The right to counsel was sustained in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). While jun.
trials were not required in juvenile delinquency hearings, MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 403
U.S. 528 (1971), Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion relied on the "idealistic prospect"
of the benevolent proceeding regarding the one facing loss of liberty. In a more recent
decision, Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), a unanimous Court emphasized
the importance of the impact of community standards through tie jury and took a more
jaundiced look at another purportedly benevolent incarceration. From the another's per-
spective, of course, incarceration under § 52-440(b) is not even arguably beneselentl
motivated.
109. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLLyM. L. REv. 780
(1943). Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Frank v. United States, 345 U.S. 147. 159
(1969), merits attention. He stated, "Those who commit offenses against court- should be
no less entitled to the Bill of Rights than those who commit offenses against the public in
general." Id. at 160.
110. The Supreme Court has repeatedly wrestled with the procedural protections
which must accompany criminal contempt since Shillitani and a companion case, Cheff'..
Schnakenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania - U.S. - 94 S. Ct.
2687 (1974) and Taylor v. Hayes, - U.S. _ 94 S. Ct. 2697 (1974); Mayberry v. Penn-
sylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (for an earlier chapter in the Codispoti litigation whose
history Justice Rehnquist found "worthy of a chapter in Charles Dickens' Bleak llous',"
in his dissent to Codispoti and Taylor, - U.S. -. -, 94 S. Ct. 2687, 2710); Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 11969). Cf. Groppa
v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972). The difficulties have been compounded by the Court's
changing perception of right to counsel and jury trial issues in the "regular" criminal
context. In Codispoti and Taylor, the Court evolved a doctrine which focuses on the
actual sentence imposed and the time of imposition to determine whether the offense
is "serious," in which case a jury trial is constitutionally required or "petty." in which
case it is not However, in Frank v. United States, supra, Justice Marshall's majority
opinion stated, "If the statute creating the offense specifies a maximum penalty, then of
course that penalty is the relevant criterion." Id. at 149 n.2. While the Codispoti majority
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seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Its termination calls for some orderly process, however
informal."111
The Morrissey decision left unanswered the extent to which informal
orderly process must include counsel when conditional liberty is at
stake. The Court's partial answer in Gagnon v. Scarpelli'12 is particu-
larly relevant to the mothers accused of contempt in Roe. The
guidelines in Scarpelli emphasize the importance of case-by-case de-
termination of the need for counsel. The Scarpelli court instructed that
counsel should be afforded "presumptively" when "there are substan-
tial reasons which justified or mitigated the violations... and. .. the
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." 113
Counsel is thus presumptively mandated for a parolee facing revoca-
tion whose interest in liberty is merely conditional. The Roe mother
faces loss of her unconditional liberty. Further, even if her offense is
clear, mitigating or justifying reasons clearly merit provision of counsel
under the Scarpelli guidelines. If a Roe mother's contempt were prop-
erly construed as criminal, she would be entitled to counsel. Since her
sentence could exceed six months, the demarcation line of "serious"
contempt sentences, she also would be entitled to a jury trial. The all
or nothing consequences flowing from the decision to affix a civil rather
than criminal label emphasize the need for increased procedural pro-
tections.
The potentially devastating psychological damage of the enforced
separation of mother and child should constitute the "sufficient conse-
quences" of loss of liberty suggested by Justices Powell and Rehnquist
as the basis for determining when counsel should be provided. 114
may have implicitly limited Frank's total deference to the statutory maximum by regard-
ing "the judgment about the seriousness of the crime" to be "normally heavily in-
fluenced by the penalty authorized by the legislature," - U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. at 2691, the
issue was not directly involved in the decision and the dissenting opinion of Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, reiterated the total deference to the legisla-
tive maximum to define seriousness and thereby afford a jury trial. Id. at 2712.
111. Taylor v. Hayes, U.S.__, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 2704, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1973).
112. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
113. Id. at 790. The Court's concern with disposition is emphasized by its reliance on
the requirement of counsel at the variously construed sentencing or probation revoca-
tion stages in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
114. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Objecting to the provision of counsel
whenever an accused faces possible incarceration, Justice Powell's concurrence argued
that the majority's rule was too narrow as well as too broad. His example was, "When
the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying
the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a
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Categorization of a contempt citation as civil does not diminish the
necessity for counsel to develop mitigating or justifying evidence. The
recalcitrant mother is in a "Russian Roulette"'1 5 situation if she dares
resist disclosure. Fundamental fairness demands at least orderly pro-
cess, individualized inquiry and appointed counsel. A right to trial by
jury might also be required. Thus, there is much at stake in properly
categorizing the contempt under § 52-440(b); even if it is correctly de-
nominated civil, however, Connecticut's filure to provide procedural
safeguards violates due process.1 16
II. "Pure" Due Process
The Connecticut statute lacks the minimal procedural protections
recently afforded a broad spectrum of individual interests.11 7 Rights as
basic as the preservation of the bond between mother and child are
overridden without counsel or counsel-substitute and without any con-
sideration of the wisdom of the mother's decision concerning her
child's best interest. Neither mother nor child has an opportunity to
confront the faceless state opponent. The failure to provide counsel to
the mother raises obvious due process problems." 8 Less obvious but
more important for Roe's doctrinal potential is the failure to provide
representation for the infant.
Unlike non-welfare illegitimates, the plaintiff children in Roe are
deprived of their mothers' authority to decide for them, but provided
denial of due process." Id. at 48 (footnote omitted). The footnote catalogued such
deprivations of sufficient consequence as loss of opportunity to hold a licensed position
and loss of civil service pension benefits. Id. n.11.
115. GOLDFARB, supra note 105, at 48.
116. The transcripts of proceedings under §52-440(b) reprinted in appendices to
the Brief for the Children of Appellants and to Brief for the Children's Legal Defense
Fund demonstrate no suggestion of providing counsel (with a single exception), Brief
for Children's Defense Fund, App. A., at 38a, no offer of ajury trial and an incredible array
ofjudicial badgering techniques which fall far short of providing fair hearings. Rather, the
women were subjected to "assembly-line justice," condemned in Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 34-36. Their treatment should compel scrutiny of § 52-440tb) with the
standard suggested by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235 (1970): "unquestionably this Court will squint hard at any legislation that de-
prives an individual of his liberty-his right to remain free." 399 U.S. at 263.
117. See. e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (personal property); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (retention of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wages). But see Mitchell v. A. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry' v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) (more than unilateral job expectations). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (particularly separate opinions by Powell and White, J.J. concurring in part at 164
and 174 respectively); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) ("conditional liberty");
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971) (freedom from stifgma).
118. See text accompanying notes 108-14 supra.
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no surrogate. They have no voice in the critical determination of
whether the state, acting as parens patriae, exercises its power as a
"wise, affectionate and careful parent."11 9 No judge determines
whether the mere threat, to say nothing of the reality, of enforced
separation from the mother is worth the speculative psychological and
economic benefits claimed by the state. The infant is left in a
no-man's-land without any adult functioning as parent.
The vital importance of representation for young children has
been widely acknowledged. 120 At a minimum, the child should be
represented by counsel or an adequate substitute who would present
evidence concerning the effects on the child of the enforced disclosure
and potential incarceration of the mother. The child is threatened with
loss of his or her natural protector without any due process safeguards
whatsoever. What for an adult would be basic liberty and property
rights clearly warranting due process protection are for an infant con-
tained within the parental prerogative. The importance to the child of
parental custody and care is emphasized by the procedural protections
afforded in dependency and neglect proceedings.12 1 The Roe situation
demands at least the judicial weighing of competing interests which is
119. Judge Cardozo's definition of the parens patriae power in Finlay v. Finlay, 240
N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
120. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD at 65-67 (1973); [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT];
essays by Forer, Coyne, Weissman, and Hansen in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN:
EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Wilkerson ed. 1973). The child's right to
counsel in a variety of long-range placement contexts has been a recurring theme in the
Family Law Quarterly. See, e.g., Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their
Parents and The State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 319-50 (1970) (other related aspects of Attorney
Kleinfeld's thesis appear under the same title at 4 FAM. L.Q. 410 (1970) and 5 FAM. L.Q.
63 (1971); Inker & Peretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM, L.Q. 108
(1971); Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and Adoption Cases, 5 FAM,
L.Q. 417, 422-23 (1971). Connecticut statutes make the appointment of counsel to repres-
ent the child's interest discretionary in custody, dependency and neglect contexts, CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. §17-66c (1972) as amended by 1973 P.A.188; 1973 P.A.373, §13, as
amended by 1974 P.A. 169, §9. For an interesting discussion of competing claims upon
an attorney in juvenile court, see Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile
Court Proceedings, A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401 (1973).
121. Statutory language compels judicial scrutiny of the child's best interests and
elaborates procedural protections for the adult parties. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 17-389(0 (1972), as amended by 1973 P.A.205, 1974 P.A.293; § 17-62 (1972), as amended
by 1973 P.A.205, 546, 625; § 43-45 (1972), as amended by 1973 P.A.156; § 45-54 (1972).
Connecticut provides a procedural means for the Welfare Commissioner to terminate
parental rights when "it would be in the best interest of any child committed to him."
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-43(a) (1972). By statute, the Commissioner has "general
supervision over the welfare of children who require the care and protection of the state."
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-32 (1972), but his or her efforts to assist are limited to
protective services or monetary assistance unless a juvenile court orders more interven-
tion after an appropriate individualized hearing.
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afforded when the state seeks to separate parent from child in other
contexts. Such balancing can be achieved only if the child's interest,
perhaps at times conflicting with the mother's, is presented by inde-
pendent counsel or counsel substitute.
The speculative nature of the claimed benefits to the child under
§ 52-440(b) emphasizes the arbitrariness of the lack of procedural pro-
tections. The state claims to serve the child's economic and psychologi-
cal needs. ' 22 However, even if the state succeeded in obtaining sup-
port payments, the child would not benefit directly. The state would
apply such funds to reduce its current payments to the child or to
recoup past expenses.' 2 3 The res judicata effect of an unsuccessful
early effort to establish paternity may render such attempts more
harmful than helpful.12 Significantly, Connecticut's highest court em-
phasized that enhancement of a child's financial position does not itself
warrant a change in custody.' 2 5
The state's excessive emphasis on paternity suits for the child's
long-term economic benefit is undercut by recent decisions which
grant even unacknowledged illegitimates such benefits as workmen's
122. A health interest could conceivably be at issue, though the Welfare Com-
missioner seems the wrong state official in such a case. The state did not argue any
health justification for the statute, which does not provide any mechanism for the
Welfare Commissioner to disseminate any health information to the Commissioner of
Health or other appropriate officials.
123. CONNECTICUT STATE WELFARE DEPARTMEN-T, SOCIAL SERVICES POLICIES
-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY PROVISIONS § 3460.22 (August 1, 1972). See Norton v.
Larrucuento, (2d Cir. Ct. Bridgeport, Nov. 23, 1973) reprinted in Brief for Children of
Appellants, App. at 39a. Further, the deserting father may well be judgment-proof or
impossible to locate. Recent federally-funded studies indicate some success in obtaining
payments which exceed costs of administering such programs. However, the data may be
skewed by many factors, including preliminary success which may later fall off drasti-
cally. Also, additional transaction costs not calculated in the equations may exist.
124. Ruocco v. Logiocco, 104 Conn. 585, 595, 134 A.173, 178 (1926) (holding a failure
to prove paternity to be res judicata). There is some evidence that important information
about blood types might not be available until after the three-year statutory period pro-
vided by Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-435(a) (1972). See ROCE & SANGEIR
BLOOD GROUPS IN MAN (1968). H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY,
Ch. 4 (1971). The three-year period also may harm the illegitimate because it may take
longer to establish the kind of amicable informal arrangement defined by statute as
"living with or contributing to the support of the illegitimate" which has been inter-
preted with increasing liberality to provide benefits to illegitimates. See, e.g., Wagner
v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Madison v.
Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 383 (M.D. La. 1973).
125. Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 142 Conn. 558, 563, 115 A.2d 659, 662 (1955):
The rule [allowing the upsetting of a parent's natural right to custody] does not
go so far as to require that faithful and devoted parents should be deprived of
their children because some wealthy relative or stranger who may have their
temporary custody for some good reason is apparently able to provide a higher
standard of living than the parents can.
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compensation and social security survivor's insurance without paternity
adjudication. 126 The very pattern of paternal relationship held deter-
minative in those cases may be destroyed by forcing an unwilling
mother to help prosecute a paternity suit.
The lower court argued that "history and literature are replete
with examples of the anguish suffered by illegitimate children denied
the satisfaction of knowing their paternity."1 27 Unequal treatment by
the law and by society explain much of the anguish. The psychological
need to search for identity of the "real" parent, emphasized by Judge
Blumenfeld, has been termed a typical adolescent preliminary step "to
achieving independence from any parental authority and reaching
maturity.' 2 8 Several of the plaintiff s affidavits indicate the possibly
devastating psychological effects of such disclosure to the illegitimate
child. 129
Two nationally-known experts on child psychological development
agreed that Connecticut's method of "benefiting" illegitimates will
often produce hostility between mother and father and between
mother and child.13 Further, the effect of enforced separation of
mother and child is usually an unmitigated psychological disaster. 131
An additional psychological burden on the child is the shame implicit
126. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Davis v. Richardson,
342 F. Supp. 588 (D.Conn.) aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). Similarly, allowing benefits
under federal programs for unacknowledged illegitimates, see Middletown v. Lucken-
back SS Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934) (Death on the High
Seas Act); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1966) (Federal
Employees Group Life Insurance, 5 U.S.C. §§2091 et seq.); Hammond v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 31 N.J. 244, 156 A. 2d 689 (1959) (F.E.L.A.). Actually, Connecticut decisions antici-
pated recent protection of illegitimates. Piccinim v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 93
Conn. 423, 106 A.330 (1919). See also Wheat v. Red Star Express Lines, 156 Conn. 245,
240 A.2d 859 (1968).
127. 356 F. Supp. at 206 n.6.
128. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT at 23.
129. One mother's affidavit asserted that her child was the product of either an in-
cestuous union or a union with an emotionally unstable person who had since disap-
peared, Rec. at 45; two mothers feared physical retaliation, Rec. at 34, 41; two intended
to marry the putative fathers and feared disclosure would jeopardize the marriages,
Rec. at 39, 42-43; one feared excommunication from her Seventh Day Adventist Church,
Rec. at 44-45; two stated the three year paternity suit statute of limitations had already
run. See also Welfare Comm. v. Stone (1st Cir. Ct. Norwalk, Jan. 28, 1974) reprinted In
Brief for Children's Defense Fund, App. at la-3a (presumed judicial inability under the
statute to make exception for a mother's realistic fear of direct physical retaliation).
130. Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D., Rec. at 62-71; affidavit of Edward Zigler,
Ph.D., Rec. at 125-28. See note 28 supra. The state offered no contrary evidence what-
soever.
131. Id. at 65, terming the effect "catastrophic." The psychological literature con-
cerning separation of parent and very young child is replete with similar descriptions
of the effects. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT at 31-34; BOWLBY, CHILD CARE
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in the inquiry. The Supreme Court recently noted that "Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless
children. -,13 Ironically, Connecticut's courts heighten the oppro-
bium.133
The state made no showing of legislative fact-finding or other
evidence to counteract the plaintiffs' evidence of vast psychological
harm. The claimed benefits cannot be assumed applicable to all il-
legitimate children of welfare mothers without consideration of indi-
vidual situations. Of course, individualized inquiry encroaches upon
the family unit even when procedural protections are afforded. But
without minimal due process, the government simply runs roughshod
over rights "to enjoy those privileges long recognized . as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men. '" 1
34
In Kent v. United States' 35 and again in In re Gault, 36 the Court
noted that the child "may get the worst of both worlds" in a system
where the government's "unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.
. . . Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances . . . of unfairness to individuals and inade-
quate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy."' 37 The Connecticut legislative scheme provides no fact-
finding inquiry and prescribes inherently unfortunate remedies.
Gault's due process analysis arguably applies only to "civil" proceed-
ings analagous to adult criminal proceedings. Decisions since Gault
indicate its direct application to other contexts and underscore recogni-
AND THE GROWTH OF LovE at 13, 219 (2d ed. 1965); BOWLBY. ATrACHMENT (1968);
M. A. AINSWORTH ET AL., DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE: A REASSESSME.NT OF
ITS EFFECTS (1962); A. FREUD & D. BuRLINGHAM, INFANTS VlTHOtrr FAMILIES: RE-
PORTS ON THE HAMPSTEAD NURSERIES (1944).
132. Weber v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972).
133. Connecticut has not followed Judge Newman's suggestion, concurring, that in
camera proceedings might be in order. 365 F. Supp. at 86 n.4. See transcripts reprinted
in Brief for Children of Appellants, Appendix; and Brief for Children's Defense Fund,
Appendix. There is no mention made of an in camera option. This is in ironic contrast
to the statutory provision compelling secrecy of adoption records. CoNN. CEN. STAT.
REV. § 45-66 (1972). It also ignores the oft-quoted recognition that "The statutory pro-
visions that a child's illegitimacy must be suppressed, in certain public records, is (sic)
an admission of the hardship that can be caused by disclosure." Zepeda v. Zepeda,
4 Ill. App. 2d. 328, 335; 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (1963).
134. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 393 (1923) (plurality opinion per Rehnquist, J.). One may safely assume that
recent judicial scrutiny of sex-based classification, whatever its categorization, would
not permit limitation of such rights to "free men." See note 100 supra.
135. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
136. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
137. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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tion that a less restrictive label may not vitiate important individual
interests. 138 In Stanley the Court emphasized the importance of the
interests involved:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangement."139
The family rights stressed in Stanley assume even greater significance
when considered from the young child's perspective. Even if the state
is right that in some cases this "integrity of the family unit" should
include an unwilling father, it cannot assume that this is always so or
threaten the remaining family unit to achieve such "integrity."
The extent of the threat is illustrated by Connecticut's failure to
consider the consequences should a mother choose jail. Actual practice
and the absence of any statutory provision for providing adequate sub-
stitute housekeepers undercut the state's benevolent claims. Could the
state institute neglect proceedings against the mother while she is
forcibly absent or upon her release? If one assumes an adequate parent
substitute, the young child's important interest in psychological con-
138. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972). These decisions, and the plethora of lower court decisions concerning tile
right to treatment and civil commitment, form the basis of the notable Fifth Circuit
decision, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. granted, - U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974). Judge Wisdom summarized decisions involving deprivation
of liberty with civil labels as "a near unanimous recognition that governments must afford
a quid pro quo when they confine citizens in circumstances where the conventional
limitations of the criminal process are inapplicable." Id. at 524. The breakdown of such
compartmentalizing as the right versus privilege distinction, Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971), and the liberty versus property distinction, see note 185 infra,
highlights the importance of an individualized evaluation of the quid the state offers for
the quo it extracts. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 n.30. The Jackson v. Indiana test
("whether the nature and duration of commitment bears some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed," 406 U.S. at 738) arguably applies only
to confinement and therefore, perhaps, solely to the Roe mother's plight. But it repre-
sents an important updating of the least drastic alternative approach. See also Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-80 (1971). Cf. the five opinions in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 977 for the current Court's difficulty applying traditional due process
balancing exemplified by Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
139. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949).
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tinuity will be upset again upon the mother's return.140 Further, the
cost of a mother's stay in jail plus the pay of a fulltime substitute
housekeeper make ludicrous the state's claims of protecting the fisc by
obtaining support contributions from absent fathers. 141
The state's belated attempt to ascribe discretion to a judge enforc-
ing § 52-440(b) is painfully empty. First, the transcripts reveal the
enforcing judges' perception that they have no option but to find
mothers in contempt and to threaten jail. 142 Second, the state's argu-
ment that the women may hire counsel is clearly a makeweight. Under
Connecticut's meager flat grant system' 43 welfare recipient mothers
are living at a subsistence level, with no extra funds for attorneys' fees.
Even if the mother were given the chance to explain her decision
not to disclose, a radical shifting of the burden of persuasion all but
resolves the issue. 1 4 To contest the state's assumption concerning
140. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child t1959). Principle 6;
The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs
love and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the (rare and
under the responsibility of his parents.... A child of tender years shall not. save
in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother.
In THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 120, at 222, Professor Keith-Lucas argued:
"Anyone who has ever worked with dependent children knows, one of the prinary
rights or needs of most of these children is to belong to and be under the guidance of
their natural parents despite inadequacies, even mistreatment in the home." Keith-
Lucas provided a valuable discussion of the distinction between a dependent child's
needs, as defined by well-meaning "interveners" and the child's rights, including
"the right to his own parent whenever possible." Id. at 218-31. See also GOLDSTEIN.
FREuD & SOLNT at 17-21, 31-34, 105-11.
141. While the state might argue that it does not actually intend to enforce the tniar-
ceration threat, this very defense highlights the potential abuse of discretion the statute
provides and the sheer irrational punitiveness of the statute. Such opportunity for abuse
has frequently been condemned by the Court. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady. 405 U.S. 504.
512 (1972) (equal protection violation if discretion prior to commitment could avoid
procedural protections). Such discretion has also formed the basis of decisions striking
down statutes on first amendment grounds. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974);
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). It also could conceivably rise to the
level of a violation of the eighth amendment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. '238 (1972).
particularly separate "majority" opinions by Justices Douglas, Stewart and White at 210.
306 and 310 respectively, and Justice Powell's dissenting opinion at 414.
142. Brief for Appellees, 29, 32. For example, one circuit judge told a cited mother,
"Well, I don't make the law. The legislature makes the law. That is what they say. that
you divulge knowledge under oath or else you spend a year in jail. It isn't the thing I
want to do anymore than you want to do it." Welfare Comm. v. A. Ar. 10th Cir. Ct., Ne%%
London, Feb. 1, 1973) reprinted in Brief for Children of Appellants. App. A at 27a-26a.
See also transcript reprinted in Brief for Children's Defense Fund, App. at 4a. 5a. 8a. But
cf. Norton v. Larracuento, (2d Cir. Ct. Bridgeport, Nov. 23, 1973).
143. See Johnson v. WVhite, 353 F. Supp. 69 (D. Conn. 1972).
144. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1965) constitutionally condemned
such burden-shifting in a case involving a natural father's parental interest:
[t]here was placed upon the petitioner the burden of affirmatively showing that
he had contributed to the support of his daughter to the limit of his financial
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what is best for her child, a mother would have to prove, without
assistance of appointed counsel or access to experts, that her own
childrearing decision was correct. What kind of proof might she offer?
What standard would she have to meet? Shifting the burden deter-
mines the outcome.
Under § 52-440(b) a mother faces all but insurmountable obstacles
in protecting her family unit. Both mother and child are threatened
with "grievous loss."'145 Without providing a hearing concerning the
individual interests of the mother and child, Big Brother quietly re-
places mother.
III. Irrebuttable Presumption "Plus"
Connecticut's statutory scheme presumes that it is always in the
best interests of an illegitimate child to force a mother on welfare to
disclose the putative father's identity. The state conceded in oral ar-
gument that under the Connecticut statute such a presumption cannot
be questioned. 146 The sole issue a judge must consider is whether the
mother will disclose the father's identity if she knows it. This proce-
dure involves issues considered in the recent irrebuttable presumption
decisions of the Supreme Court. These decisions, however, leave the
appropriate standard and correct application of the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine unresolved.
Vlandis v. Kline147 first articulated a new irrebuttable presump-
tion approach. In striking down a statute denying students defined as
non-residents the tuition advantage afforded to residents, the Court
declared that the statute violated due process because of its "conclu-
sive and unchangeable presumption of non-resident status" which was
"not necessarily or universally true in fact.' 148 The Vlandis approach
has produced outraged dissents and stinging academic criticism. 149
ability over the period involved. The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner
were real, not purely theoretical. For "it is plain that where the burden of proof
lies may be decisive of the outcome." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525.
145. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring):
The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardship of a criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.
See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
146. Supra note 37.
147. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
148. 412 U.S. at 452, emphasizing reasonable fact-finding alternatives.
149. See, e.g., id. at 459 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) and at 463
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Douglas, J.); Note, The Irrebuttable
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The revival of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine1 50 has its
origins in a procedural due process decision and several equal protec-
tion decisions during the last decade.15 ' Its application has been incon-
sistent and its standard protean. Irrebuttable presumption decisions
thus far offer neither predictability nor cogent standards and appear an
easy target for "slippery slope" attacks.' 52
The Roe case allows the Court to apply this doctrine while evolv-
ing a new, more sophisticated theoretical basis which may answer
charges that irrebuttable presumption analysis inevitably threatens
"[c]ountless state and federal statutes"' 53 and that "the Court seems to
misunderstand the nature of an irrebuttable presumption.' 154 Judicial
scrutiny of irrebuttable presumptions is clearly less deferential to legis-
latures than traditional rational relation review. Indeed, irrebuttable
presumption review has been criticized as "a hybrid, if not simply a
confusion" of equal protection and traditional due process review with
closest resemblance to equal protection's "strict scrutiny" of the "tight-
ness of fit" of means adopted to further legislative ends.155
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (1974); Note, The
Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 800 (1974). For a good try at a defense see Comment, The Right to Rebut: Con-
clusive Presumptions in Civil Cases, 6 CONN. L. REv. 725 (1974).
150. The interchangeable terms defining the new test, "irrebuttable" and "conclu-
sive" presumption, are traceable to the pre-Roosevelt Court em when state taxes as well
as regulatory legislation frequently fell before judicial due process assaults. See Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm., 284 U.S. 206 (1931); Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
151. Justice Stewart's Vlandis opinion reinterpreted several decisions as sources for
modem irrebuttable presumption doctrine, including Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (finding denial of a hearing to a natural father of illegitimates afforded other
parents violative of equal protection); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (forbidding
forfeiture of a driver's license by an uninsured motorist involved in an accident absent
minimal due process procedures); and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidat-
ing Texas' denial of resident status to servicemen for purposes of voting, based on equal
protection).
152. Chief Justice Burger charged that "literally thousands of state statutes" would be
susceptible to irrebuttable presumption attack, 412 U.S. at 462.
153. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632. 657 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting joined by Burger, C.J.).
154. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note
149, at 1544.
155. Id. at 1547. See generally Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal
Process or Due Protection?, supra note 149. Justice Marshall's rather lonely attempt to
adopt a "sliding-scale" standard for equal protection review in such dissents as San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-100 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471. 519-30
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.) seems to have attracted a new sup-
porter when cloaked in irrebuttable presumption garb, \'landis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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Dissenting Justices have characterized the new doctrine as the
much-feared return of substantive due process. 156 Although the emerg-
ing theory has already produced one renunciation, 157 only one of its
original Supreme Court detractors has remained consistently op-
posed. 158 Nevertheless, even the doctrine's advocates do little more
than cite it and assert its relevance to cases before them. The confusion
and criticism surrounding irrebuttable presumption analysis makes it
easy for lower courts to dismiss it summarily, as the lower court did in
Roe.
No convincing explication of the hybrid doctrine has yet provided
it with a solid theoretical underpinning. Nevertheless in some cases
the doctrine is both explainable and justifiable. It is properly invoked
in situations such as Roe, in which the legislative body:
1) classifies with broad generality by "legislative notice"
which affects constitutionally significant interests;
2) denies, by its presumptive classification, direct gov-
ernmental benefits or directly burdens a class which lacks
156. See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at
467-68 and United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 524 (1973)
(discussed at note 161 infra). Justice Rehnquist is himself willing to invoke substantive
due process shadows to help decide contemporary cases. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 157 (1974). While the initial irrebuttable presumption decisions were very much a
part of the heyday of substantive due process, see note 150 supra, the modern doctrine
differs significantly. The Court has not simply been rejecting legislative ends based on
its own "unyielding negativism," McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 40. See also Tribe, The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973). Nor has the Court been imposing the drastic
all-or-nothing remedies substantive due process analysis recalls. See generally, Sub-
stantive Due Process Section infra.
157. Justice Powell concurring in the result in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 651, preferred equal protection analysis to a doctrine which, he argued, even
used selectively, "at root often will be something else masquerading as a due process
doctrine. That something else, of course, is the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 652.
Significantly, Justice Powell reiterated his Rodriguez equal protection test, supra
note 72, and applied it stringently. He acknowledged that there were "indeed some
legitimate state interests at stake," but regarded the mandatory leave for pregnant teach-
ers as an equal protection violation because "it has not been shown that they are
rationally furthered by the challenged portions of these regulations." Id. at 653 n.2
(emphasis added). Accordingly, "rational basis" equal protection review mandated
striking down the regulations because the defendant school board had not met its burden
of showing a sufficient nexus between regulation and rationale.
158. Chief Justice Burger utilized the Vlandis standard directly, albeit without cita-
tion, as a basis for his Jiminez v. Weinberger majority opinion, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974);
Justice Douglas authored the majority opinion striking down an irrebuttable presumption
in United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Justice Rehnquist
alone remained consistent in his opposition. He again dissented in Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657 and in Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 638.
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access to the classifier and is without significant political in-
fluence; and
3) affords no opportunity to cross the classifing line
-even when such an opportunity could be easily afforded.
If governmental classification fits all three criteria, then what
might be termed an irrebuttable-presumption-plus test should apply.
The burden of justification then shifts to the state and requires more
than the "mere rationality" of administrative convenience.' 5 9 If the
state fails to justify the challenged classification, the remedy need not
be its elimination. Rather, the appropriate remedy will usually be
the institution of corrective procedures to bring about individualized
treatment in the application of the legislative categories.
Several of the recent "irrebuttable presumption" decisions do not
fully meet the above test and the doctrine was too readily invoked. Bell
v. Burson160 should be relegated to its procedural due process origins.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur16' did not involve close-to-
permanent exclusion from direct governmental benefits and the plain-
tiffs arguably were not excluded from the decision-making process.
LaFleur and United States Department of Agriculture v. Mumjr6 2
most nearly resemble traditional minimal equal protection review, at
least as such analysis scrutinizes legislative findings or presumptions of
facts and considers whether actual implementation supports initial
legislative assumptions. 163
The most difficult irrebuttable presumption decision is probably
Vlandis, which is complicated by the fact that a portion of the majority
voiced approval of a one-year waiting period before achievement of
159. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 646, citing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1973).
160. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Bell did involve a personal hardship in that the uninsured
motorist who lost his license without a hearing apparently depended upon his car for
transportation vital to his job as a traveling clergyman. Id. at 537. Such an interest should
have been balanced via procedural due process analysis following Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) because other aspects of irrebuttable presumption plus were absent.
161. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). LaFleur held mandatory pregnancy leave for teachers viola-
tive of due process because of "unwarranted conclusive presumptions that seriously
burden the exercise of protected constitutional liberty." Id. at 651. The Court thereby
avoided the sex discrimination claim which had been the gravamen of the complaint.
162. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Mumj held that needy households could not be denied
foodstamps by a 1970 amendment aimed at college students which excluded households
from eligibility which contained anyone over 18 years old claimed as a dependent for
federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer not a member of the household during the
prior tax period.
163. See generally Equal Protection Section, supra notes 71-75, 83.
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resident status. 164 Increasing judicial reluctance to identify interests as
singularly important 65 may explain why the Court did not fit Vlandis
into the equal protection model of such cases as Shapiro v.
Thompson. 166 The combination of non-access to the classifier and per-
manent denial of an obvious government benefit supported irre-
buttable-presumption-plus analysis in Vlandis-although the benefit
itself (less expensive college tuition) would not ordinarily be signif-
icant enough to merit such scrutiny and the Court was unwilling to
regard the challenged regulation as itself a constitutionally invalid
restriction on interstate travel.
The Carrington v. Rash 167 and Stanley decisions represent irre-
buttable-presumption-plus in its clearest form. All the other irre-
buttable presumption decisions, with the possible exception of Bell,
concerned recognized, constitutionally significant interests.' 68 But
Carrington dealt with exclusion from the right to vote of persons who
were thereby permanently deprived of access to the local Texas clas-
sifier. Similarly, in Stanley, Illinois simply "non-parented" Peter Stan-
ley and offered him no forum to assert or prove parental rights held to
be "far more precious . . . than property rights.' 16 9
Irrebuttable-presumption-plus analysis does contain elements of
"legitimate articulated state interest" equal protection review and
classic procedural due process balancing. But it also involves constitu-
tionally significant individual interests which would trigger a more
scrupulous equal protection scrutiny than either the oft-invoked
"merely conceivable" justification or judicial deference to economic or
164. 412 U.S. at 452 & n.9. Previously the Court had summarily affirmed a three-judge
court decision, Starns v. Mallerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mere. 401
U.S. 985 (1971), upholding a one-year nonresident presumption.
165. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 537 (1971) stressed that the petitioner was a cler-
gyman who would be "severely handicapped in the performance of his duties by a
suspension of his licenses." Other recent decisions emphasized more important per-
sonal interests. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
627 (1969). Compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972). But see note 183
infra, concerning the difficulty in ascertaining the importance of any personal Interest.
166. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro recognized a pre-constitutional basic right to travel
interstate and vividly illustrates two-tier equal protection scrutiny.
167. See note 151 supra.
168. The interest protected in Stanley is discussed infra, text accompanying note
169. The other decisions involved three constitutional rights: the Vlandis majority
only implied the right to travel but it was the basis for Justice Marshall's concurrence,
412 U.S. at 455; Murr was based on the right of association plus basic survival neces-
sities; and LaFleur involved the right to a personalized decision regarding child-bearing.
169. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
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social regulation. 1 70 Classificatory exclusion and a direct relationship
between individual and government further differentiate irrebuttable
presumption decisons from the third-party classificatory schemes un-
successfully challenged in traditional equal protection cases. 171
Careful application of the irrebuttable-presumption-plus criteria
would concentrate on the importance of the interests, access to the
classifier and the feasibility of alternative means of classification. Such
an approach should allay fears that, for example, all age distinctions
might be held unconstitutional.1 7 2 A minor is not permanently denied
access to such relatively insignificant interests as drinking or driving
below the statutory age. The minor seeks something he or she does
not yet have. By contrast, the mandatory retirement of a 70-year-old
civil servant is more difficult to justify. Though the older citizen does
enjoy access to the classifier, his case is distinguishable because he
can claim a vested "expectancy.' l7 3 All the modem irrebuttable pre-
sumption decisions except Vlandis and Carrington contain elements
of already-granted entitlements. 174 In Vlandis and Carrington perma-
170. Supra note 83.
171. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). See also Ely, Tie Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 933 n.85 (1973) (regarding the
important distinction between "we-they" classifications and "they-they" classifications);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 501, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), affd and modified sub norna.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This distinction helps explain why
neither Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), nor North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) warranted irrebuttable presumption
review and why an irrebuttable presumption claim failed in Mourning v. Family Publica-
tions Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376-77 (1973). In Mourning, for example, the corporate
plaintiff attempted to void a Federal Reserve Board regulation compelling finance
charge disclosure for all consumer sales payable in more than four installments. The
burden was too tenuous and the complainant not sufficiently isolated to warrant appli-
cation of the doctrine. Corporate efforts to save money or to make more apparently do
not successfully invoke modem irrebuttable presumption protection, in sharp contrast
to the period of the doctrine's origin.
172. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting).
173. Young and old are distinguishable on a Roth-Sindcrnann basis which affords
procedural protection when taking away "entitlements" but not when granting new in-
terests or protecting unilateral expectancies. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564. 577
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,599-603 (1972) ("more than a unilateral expec-
tation.., a legitimate claim of entitlement"). The old person has something important the
state wishes to take away; the youth merely seeks to gain something initially. Sec
generally Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J.
733 (1964). But see McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 416 U.S. 986 (1974) dismissing, 454 Pa.
129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973) for want of substantial federal question (state policemen man-
datorily retired at age 60 after 39 years service). Cf. Weisbred v. Lynn. 43 U.S.L.W. 2181(D.D.C. 1974).
174. Bell involved potential serious occupational hardship to the petitioner in taking
away his driver's license; Stanley took away parental rights to custody of children; Murry
took away necessary food stamps; LaFleur took away the right to continued employment.
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nent exclusion is the most important element, but both contain
notions that citizens are "entitled" to the perquisites denied them.
The expectancy distinction between the driving youth and the
aging worker helps explain the puzzling irrebuttable presumption deci-
sion in Murry in contrast to the more traditional equal protection
analysis in Moreno, its companion food stamp case.11 5 The Mumj
statute took away foodstamps; the statute challenged in Moreno estab-
lished initial eligibility. Such a dubious distinction underscores the
technical nature of "vested" interest analysis. Irrebuttable presumption
analysis is most appropriately invoked when government directly bur-
dens an existing interest.
Roe involves a statutory classification which the state argues pre-
sumptively benefits illegitimates and their mothers. The parties stig-
matized by the classification, however, perceive the statutory scheme
as imposing a permanent, onerous burden. Welfare mothers of il-
legitimates and the illegitimates themselves lack access to the classifier
and do not have political clout. The classification affects constitutionally
protected rights of both child and mother, yet neither is afforded an
opportunity to cross the presumptive line drawn by the legislature.
Accordingly, Roe presents an opportunity for the Court to make impor-
tant refinements in the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Although
the Court's destination in its march "under the banner of irrebuttable
presumptions"'176 is still uncertain, the irrebuttable-presumption-plus
analysis provides a rough map.
IV. Substantive Due Process.
Roe v. Wade177 and Doe v. Bolton 178 make use of the feared
substantive due process, although with more deference than in its
heyday.179 The doctrine's recent manifestation indicates that some per-
sonal interests are so important that the state may not intrude absent
compelling countervailing reasons which may require reference to data
175. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
176. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 652 (Powell, J. concurring).
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
179. For a quick introduction to substantive due process, a phrase nearly as pejorative
in legal discourse as conflict of interest, see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34. For background
about the initial utilization of the substantive due process doctrine to protect capital, see
A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF THE BAlR AND
BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960). The doctrine's heyday is generally considered the 1920's and
1930's, although Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which has come to symbolize
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from other disciplines. Even those sympathetic with the outcome in
the abortion decisions, however, find the doctrine open-ended and
difficult to justify.180
Nonetheless, the role-allocation aspect of substantive due process
identified by Professor Tribe in his apologia for the abortion decisions
is applicable to Connecticut's assumed role as protector of illegitimate
children. Tribe argued that scientific uncertainty and an atmosphere of
clashing religious beliefs undercut legislative competence to decide the
difficult abortion issue and thereby compelled judicial intervention to
protect private autonomy. Roe v. Norton does not involve the religious
entanglements crucial to Tribe's argument, but his suggestion of a
"personal question"'81 buffer restricting legislative meddling with the
indispensable "right to family self-definition"182 is important. Clearly,
a mother's. autonomy concerning her child's interest is the norm. The
government should be required to justify any alteration of this basic
"allocation of competence."' 18 3 The level of justification required varies
with the significance of the private interest involved and the rationale
for the legislative action. The very lack of legislative fact-finding cou-
pled with previous judicially forbidden attempts to penalize those
whose judgment is being superseded by the statute renders the state's
motivation highly suspect.
The Court need not undercut post-West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish'84 deference to legislative judgment to disavow Connecticut's
overriding of a normally private prerogative. The challenged legislation
an entire judicial approach, was earlier, and inroads were made in the Court's harsh
regulating of regulators via substantive due process in decisions such as Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) before the famous 1937 line of demarcation symbolized b% West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
180. The most perceptive critiques include Tribe, Foretord: Tozrard a .MIodel of
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973) and Ely. The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Se also lie. mann
& Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765
(1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
181. Tribe, supra note 180, at 32. It is described as "'a doctrine embodying the con-
cept that some types of choices ought to be remanded, on principle, to private decision-
makers unchecked by substantive governmental control."
182. Id. at 36.
183. Id. at 13, quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BUsNCH 104 01962).
184. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For evidence of the profound effLect of pre-West Coast Hotel
judicial "usurpation" on New Dealers, see, e.g., Justice Douglas' decision decreeing
deference to legislatures in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 019551 ha..
anxious distinguishing of the Warren Court from the pre-Roosevelt Court in Fla.t s.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (concurring), and his fear of the monster's return in
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 & n.10 (1974) and Boddie %. Connecticut. 401 U.S.
371, 384 (concurring).
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unquestionably affects important personal rights. 185 The state lacks
factual basis for its assumption that forced disclosure either will be in
the child's best interest or will actually benefit the state. The total
absence of factual support and the failure to provide an individualized
enforcement mechanism demands judicial review. The "new" substan-
tive due process scrutiny need not characterize legislative goals as
inherently improper, but it should require evidence supporting legisla-
tive assumptions which abrogate individual choice when basic interests
are affected. For example, in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton the
Court rejected legislative assumptions of fact concerning the first
trimester of pregnancy, required reference to expert decision-makers
during the next trimester, and accepted the legislative judgment dur-
ing the final trimester (because of sufficient factual basis).
The Roe v. Wade opinion "fails to justify any of the lines actually
drawn."' 186 But the Court's willingness to draw lines and its rejection of
an all-or-nothing approach to legislation affecting important personal
rights is applicable to Roe v. Norton. Mother and child have defined
themselves as a family; the legislative wish to intervene must be halted
absent a sufficiently convincing, adequately supported rationale.
Otherwise, a political arm, incapable of the sensitive individual treat-
ment the issues demand, hacks through the "personal question" thick-
et to trespass upon the mother's zone of competence. A parent's au-
tonomy and a child's best interests are too complex to be abandoned to
Connecticut's simple solution.
PRIVACY
Roe v. Norton involves consideration of two distinct levels of pri-
vacy and suggests a possible reconciliation of the two. The first con-
cerns the parent's right to autonomy in child rearing absent some
185. A clearcut property rights-personal rights dichotomy is both analytically impossi-
ble, (see, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 79, at 54-59) and constitutionally unsupported,
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). Nonetheless, justice Bran-
deis' almost self-evident statement during the height of substantive due process merits
attention. He maintained that "the reasonableness of every regulation is dependent on
the relevant facts," New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 301-02 (1932). Inevita-
bly, the importance of the interest being overridden creeps back into any equaition guid-
ing judicial review of a challenged legislative scheme. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971). The very intangibility of parental authority and the child's
interest in the private decision defining his or her fimily make Brandeis' balancing test
difficult. Nevertheless, such an approach compels reversal in Roe v. Norton becaus,
obviously important interests of the mother and child are being vitiated by a regulation
whose benefit is purely hypothetical. The proper allocation of competences requires at
state's showing of an overriding interest prior to running roughshod over parental
competence generally presumed primary. Id. at 377.
186. Tribe, supra note 180, at 5.
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compelling reason for the state to interfere. The second involves the
right to secrecy surrounding sexual conduct and childbearing. The
Connecticut statute impinges upon both parental autonomy and sexual
privacy. It directly affects the right of parent and child to define their
own family unit. Neither privacy interest is absolute. The two concerns
combine in a new private associational right: Roe is an ideal vehicle for
development of that right. It also may be a means toward further
elaboration of a constitutionally-protected right to resist disclosure ab-
sent compelling state justifications and adequate safeguards.
I. Parental Autonomy
The older cases contain pious proclamations concerning "the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."' 8 7 Modern cases continue to emphasize
the "enduring American tradition" of treating the parental role in a
child's upbringing as "primary . . . beyond debate."'188 Indeed, such
interests are entitled to "special safeguards"'1 9 and may be so en-
twined in "[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution"'9" as to %warrant
ninth amendment protection. The parent even has a right to be wvrong
concerning the child's best interests. As a constituent of the family, the
child shares an interest in preservation of that right, even if the parent
is sometimes mistaken about optimal choices.19 Indeed, the explana-
tion for the parental right is largely the intimacy of the family unit and
the beneficial effects of the family on the child's development. 192 This
187. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Such "liberty" was
expressed in the recognition that "the child is no mere creature of the state" and of the
concomitant "right coupled with ... high duty" of the parent or guardian to guide the
child's destiny. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Because of the substantive due process context of Meyer and
Pierce and specifically Justice McReynold's authorship, their holdings have been too
readily dismissed by critics of the judicial period which, it has been aptly said, "'threatens
to give freedom a bad name." Chambers, Altcrnatices to Cicil Commitiment of the Men-
tally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatices. 70 MICH. L. REv. 1108, 1167
(1972).
188. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
189. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973). "The Constitution extends spe-
cial safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special privacy rights
such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education."
190. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg. J., concurring).
See generally Rhoads & Patula, The Ninth Amendment: A Sur'ey of Theory and Practice
in the Federal Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DENvEn L. J. 153 (1973).
191. Judicial declarations have concentrated on the parent's interest, overlooking the
interest a young child shares in parental autonomy. See note 217 infra.
192. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944): "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.
19741
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judicial respect for parental discretion is exemplified by the line drawn
in Ginsberg v. New York, 193 forbidding sales of" 'girlie' magazines" to
children but tolerating sales to parents who buy the same materials for
their children. 194
However, parental autonomy is not unlimited.1 95 A graphic exam-
ple in the welfare context was Wyman v. James,196 which sustained a
regulation conditioning AFDC payments upon consent to a case-
worker's visit to the recipient's home. The 5-4 majority unquestion-
ingly assumed that the caseworker forced upon the welfare mother was
"a friend to one in need" and that the child's interest warranted the
compulsory visit. 197 The Court's presumption of benevolence was not
explained, despite compelling contrary arguments offered by the
dissenters. 198 Wyman was essentially a fourth amendment decision
... And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter." The Prince Court recognized that the case
involved "two claimed liberties" and explicitly distinguished the adult's (actually tile
guardian's) and the child's interests. Id. at 164. Of course, the Prince holding, narrowed
considerably in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-30 (1972), allowed states "a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare." 321 U.S. at 167. Significantly, however, the emphasis in Prince was on per-
ceived "severe" dangers to the child rather than claimed governmental amelioration of
the child's situation. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra at 230. Justice Murphy, dissenting,
emphasized the questionable factual assumption regarding the potential threat to tile
child's well-being and the drastic burden shifting countenanced by the Court. 321 U.S.
at 173-75 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Prevention of harm to children is surely a more ap-
pealing basis for state intervention than affirmative state action assertedly to improve
the child's situation. This distinction is helpful in delimiting the holding in Prince. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra; cf. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 917-20 (E.D. Pa.
1973); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SOLNIT 7-8 (1973).
193. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
194. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan said: "[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the par-
ents claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children Is
basic in the structure of our society." Id. Accordingly, though the Court asserted that "the
state has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth," id. at 640, it defended
the challenged statute on the grounds that it "does not bar parents who so desire from
purchasing the magazines for their children." Id. at 639. Thus, the Ginsberg Court reiter-
ated the Prince articulation of the state's interest in "its youth" but nonetheless respected
parental authority. Cf. Justice Fortas's claim that the 16-year-old actually "was enlisted
by his mother to go to the luncheonette and buy some 'girlie' magazines so that Ginsberg
could be prosecuted." Id. at 671-72 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
195. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1970); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
196. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
197. Id. at 309, 318-19, 323 (1971).
198. Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 338 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissent-
ing). Justice Douglas stated the case's central question to be "whethex the government by
force of its largesse has the power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Id.
at 328. Justice Marshall noted that the majority alternated benevolent and self-interested
rationales, id. at 344, and invoked past precedent invalidating the coerced consent relied
on by the majority. See note 200 infra.
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asserting the reasonableness of the investigation; the privacy issue per
se was not addressed. Justice Blackmun's opinion purported to involve
individualized determination of the need for home visits. He indicated
that the outcome would have been different if the sanctions imposed
were criminal and argued that Mrs. James' privacy was accorded due
respect.199 Finally, the majority insisted that Mrs. James had con-
sented to the visit because she had always had the option of withdraw-
ing her request for needed assistance.200
Wyman is distinguishable from Roe. The Connecticut statute im-
poses a sanction and does not provide the individualized determination
which apparantly satisfied the Wyman majority. Connecticut baldly
eliminates the parental prerogative altogether. Even the "choice" af-
forded Mrs. Wyman is denied mothers under § 52-440(b).
Connecticut's assault on parental autonomy is aldn to the "public
school only" rule struck down in Pierce and the ban on foreign lan-
guages overturned in Meyer. Those legislative schemes, like Con-
necticut's, made no concession to the wishes of parents concerning
child raising. In both cases, the state arrogated to itself sole authority
to determine the interests of children. That arrogation was the es-
sential constitutional infirmity and it infects Connecticut's statute as
well.
Despite his willingness to allow inquiry which itself encroached
upon parental authority, Judge Newman acknowledged in his concur-
rence that:
In its application, this statute will involve privacy rights con-
cerning both procreation and child rearing .... It is certainly
an important aspect of child rearing for a mother to decide
whether to secure legally some actual or potential financial
benefit for her child at the expense of harming the child by
inflicting upon it distressing knowledge such as incestuous
parentage. Decisions on such matters would plainly seem to
199. Id. at 321, 323 (1971).
200. Id. at 324. "Mrs. James has the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence
in the form of cessation of aid... flows from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and
nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved." Id. This rather incredible "choice" was
somehow regarded as consistent with the state's beneficent concerns which the decision
constantly emphasized.
How the mother's choice of refusal and forfeiture of aid could be reconciled with her
child's interest was not explained. This anomaly underscores the conflicting governmen-
tal economic and benevolent rationales which are even more overt in Roe v. Norton. In
enforcing CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-440(b) (1972), the mother is afforded no option to
leave assistance and be left alone-at least if one credits the assertion that the statute is
applicable to all mothers of illegitimates, even those not on welfare.
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enjoy no less constitutional protection than the decision
whether to educate the child at a public or private school. 20 1
Even if the state's questionable rationale of protecting the child's
interest justifies some encroachment, Connecticut may not proceed by
simply sweeping away individual interests. Such a conflict between
state and parent, bearing directly on the child's psychological interests,
should at the least require the type of expert evaluation of individual
circumstances suggested by Roe v. Wade and LaFleur.20
Last term, the Court insisted that it "has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family choice is
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,"20 3 and applied'a least-restrictive-alternative ap-
proach to an impingement of that right. 20 4 In contrast, Connecticut
"insists on presuming rather than proving 205 the character of a vital
family interest, making no allowances for the different circumstances
of different families. This abrogation of the parent's rights effected by
the Connecticut statute is greater than that permitted in Wyman.
The benefit to the child, questionably assumed by the Wyman Court,
is considerably more doubtful in Roe. The interest of the parent is
more directly burdened, and that of the child is even less obviously
advanced. The Court should accord parental interests proper weight,
while assessing the state's claim of beneficence. Intensive scrutiny of
the sort applied by the Court in Gault is more appropriate than the
unquestioning review by the Wyman Court. Lax as the Wyman stan-
dards were, the Connecticut statute could not survive them.
II. Secrecy
Since Griswold, the constitutional right to privacy concerning sex-
ual activities has been expanded to protect unmarried individuals 20
and to shield mothers' abortion decisions. 20 7 The limitations on the
201. 365 F. Supp. 65, 84-85 (D. Conn. 1973) (Newman, J., concurring).
202. See note 13 supra.
203. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). The opinion
continued with citation to a host of privacy decisions, old and new. The Court rather
inexplicably viewed the LaFleur maternity leave regulations as a "heavy burden"
penalizing particular childbearing protected freedoms. Id. at 640. The Connecticut
statute could be viewed as a similarly attenuated, but nonetheless constitutionally
invalid, penalty on childbearing.
204. Id. at 647. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Chambers, supra note
187.
205. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
206. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
207. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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latter are instructive. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe v.
Wade, distinguished some rights such as the childrearing interests
protected by Pierce and Meyer, because the pregnant mother "cannot
be isolated in her privacy" and because the competing interest of a
"potential human life" necessarily limits the woman's privacy which is
no longer sole."2 0 8
A visibly pregnant woman has already disclosed something about
her sexual conduct.20 9 Even if the Connecticut statute might provide
some long-term economic or psychological benefits to children, such
competing interests are not so compelling as potential life. Further,
the mother's secrecy concerns are poignantly supported by transcripts
of actual utilization of the statutes.2 10 The broad scope of judicial in-
quiry into sexual activity and the prurient attitude ith which Connec-
ticut judges pursue it exceeds even the broad claimed interest of the
state.
Such individual interest should compel the state to justify its in-
quiry, and to establish procedures to contain its investigation narrowly.
Connecticut has met no such burden, nor does it afford procedural
protections. Though the secrecy element of privacy is not absolute, it
demands that "a neutral magistrate" undertake "the important respon-
sibility for balancing societal and individual interest. s" 2 1 1 Procedure
under § 52-440(b), however, is grossly overreaching and wholly insen-
sitive to the delicate concerns upon vhich it intrudes.
HI. Associational Interests
The associational interest of mother and child provides the Court
with its most interesting opportunity to develop ideas merely hinted at
208. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159 (1973).
209. The lower court concluded, a bit too readily, that "the 'embarrassing' information
has in large part been disclosed before any inquiries are made." 365 F. Supp. at 77. Judge
Blumenfeld took Justice Blackmun's reference to the pregnant woman's lack of isolation
to be a recognition of the usually obvious physical nature of pregnancy. Id. n. 19. A more
plausible reading connects Justice Blackmun's reference to the need to balance the
pregnant woman's interests against those of her child-to-be. There are, of course, well-
known if not time-honored ways to give birth to illegitimates away from the perception of
the local community.
210. Revelations sought by the Connecticut judges applying §52-440{b) concerning
who the father was and the circumstances of conception, e.g., supra note 54, certainly
illustrate the possibility of additional embarrassment from disclosure of intimate details.
See, e.g., Roe v. Norton, Rec. at 45 (possibility of incestuous union); Brief for Children's
Defense Fund, App. 22a-25a (fear of physical harm and of interference with planned
marriage to another man).
211. California Bankers Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Powell, J.. con-
curring, joined by Blackmun, J.). Justice Powell worried that the bank record-keeping
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heretofore. As Justice Marshall stated last term, "The freedom of as-
sociation is often inextricably entwined with the constitutionally
guaranteed right of privacy." 21 2 In the case of an inarticulate infant,
the familial definition provided by the parent represents the child's
basic interests combined in one package of rights.213 Application of
first amendment protections to a two year old is implausible. But
protection of the familial closure and its associational interests is the
infant's fundamental right-equivalent to the more traditional civil
rights and civil liberties of adults. Indeed, the family is the basic
protective institution of the child's "very special place in life which law
should reflect." 214 In Stanley the Court stressed the familial "private
interest . . . that . . . undeniably warrants deference" and reiterated
the principles requiring governmental respect for the "integrity of the
family unit."215 The Court has emphasized the importance to the child
of even informal family units in several equal protection decisions
upholding claims of illegitimates. 216
The child's perception of his own best interests has seldom been
considered by the Court, even when the child is old enough to be
questioned. 217 Certainly government must recognize that "[O]ne of
the most basic forms of human association in our society is the family,
and the idea of 'family' as the most powerful and intimate center of
human feeling and trust runs through a long series of familiar constitu-
scheme at issue "would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. Moreover, the
potential for abuse is particularly acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits
access to this information without invocation of the judicial process."
212. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See note 79 supra.
213. Cf. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) for
Judge J. Skelly Wright's development of the jurisprudence of "package(d]" interests In
another context.
214. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter continued, "Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty towards
children." An apt warning in the Roe context.
215. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Some jurisdictions even recognize a compensable in-
terest in an "undisturbed family life," W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 887 (4th ed. 1971).
216. See note 93 supra.
217. Thus in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972), the majority did not
believe it important to find out what the Amish children who had eighth-grade educa-
tions desired. But see Justice Douglas' dissent, id. at 241, 243-46. Compare Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (acknowledging the
first amendment rights of children 13, 15, and 16 years old) with Ginsberg v, New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a restriction on a 16-year-old "child's" access to
magazines not claimed to be obscene for adults). See also Note, State Intrusion Into
Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1396 n.68 (1974).
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tional decisions."2 8 As the Stanley Court noted, even if parent and
child are eventually reunited, the parent "suffers from the deprivation
of his children and the children from uncertainty and dislocation. "219
Without adequate procedures which reveal powerful countervailing
state interests, "the State spites its own articulated goals when it need-
lessly separates [a parent] from his family. " 220 There must be some
compelling governmental rationale for invading a young child's associa-
tional nexus because the infant's equivalent of "fundamental interests"
is the "right to be let alone," 2 2 1 with his parent guiding the familial
closure's destiny.
IV. Governmental Interests in Information and Individual Rights
Connecticut affords a mother cited under § 52-440(b) full fifth
amendment transactional immunity. 222 The lower court assumed that
this immunity answers all constitutional claims to a right to resist
disclosure.22 3 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, indicate that
while the state has a right to every man's testimony,22 that right is not
limitless. The mothers in Roe may have first amendment rights not to
disclose. The Supreme Court has implied that there may be other
justifications for resisting disclosure.
The majority opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes22 emphasized the
importance of the governmental interest in law enforcement and the
unique powers and protections of the grand jury. Justice White
stressed the secrecy of grand jury proceedings and noted, "[n]othing
in the record indicates that these grand juries were 'probing at will
and without relation to existing need.' "226 Implicitly, the outcome
218. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Ruhs in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1973).
219. 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972) (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 653.
221. This is Justice Brandeis' classic statement of the privacy interest. Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
222. The immunity is granted by incorporation of CONN. GL'.'. STT. REv. § 52-435tb)
(1972).
223. The only limitation on that power [to compel testimony] found in the
Constitution is the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination....
With the privilege not to be compelled to incriminate themselves completely
safeguarded, all that could arguably support the plaintiffs' unwillingness to ans-
wer the particular inquiry authorized by the state would be simply a rule of
evidence classified as an evidentiary privilege. (footnote omitted)
365 F. Supp. at 76.
224. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972). See also Hurtado v. United
States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973).
225. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
226. Id. at 694.
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would have been different without such a relation to existing need.
Such a relation is not demonstrated in investigations under § 52-
440(b), and the mothers being questioned may well have a signifi-
cant, constitutionally-protected right to refuse to answer. Justice
White reiterated both the Bates v. Little Rock 227 test which requires
a "reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental
purpose asserted as its justification" and the Gibson v. Florida In-
vestigation Committee228 test, under which the government must
"convincingly show a substantial relation between the information
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."
Both tests were met in Branzburg because of the investigator's good
faith, the importance of the criminal inquiry and the "pragmatic
view" that the press "is far from helpless to protect itself from harass-
ment or substantial harm."2 2 9 The Roe opinion does not exhibit
Branzburg's scrutiny of the legitimacy of the investigation combined
with sensitivity to first as well as fifth amendment rights .230 The good
faith of Connecticut's investigations is doubtful and the governmental
objectives are clearly less compelling than those of a criminal investiga-
tion. The self-protective capabilities of the target mothers are compara-
tively negligible. Unlike the press, they lack access to attorneys or
means to combat overzealous investigation by appeal to public sym-
pathy.
The importance of case-by-case scrutiny of investigations was em-
phasized in Justice Powell's swing-vote concurring opinion in
Branzburg.231 He went further than Justice White in stressing the
"tried and traditional" need to balance "vital constitutional and societal
interests on a case-by-case basis" and concurred because the courts
would be available to protect "legitimate first amendment inter-
ests."-232 No such protection is available to the Roe mothers.
227. Id. at 700, quoting 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
228. Id. at 700-01, quoting 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
229. Id. at 706.
230. The court recognized that "grand juries must operate within the limits of the
First Amendment as well as the Fifth." Id. at 708.
231. Id. at 709-10. With tongue in cheek, Justice Stewart recently stated that Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, which he had termed "enigmatic" in his Branzburg dissent,
id. at 725, actually made Branzburg a 412-4V2 decision. Sesquicentennial Keynote Ad-
dress, Yale Law School, November 2, 1974.
232. Id. at 710. Developing a theme he has stressed before, Justice Powell reiterated
the constitutional requirement of individualized inquiry. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (dissenting) (rejecting an absolute ban on prisoner
interviews, but also rejecting ad hoc balancing as an alternative); California Bankers
Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (1974) (concurring) (discussing potential constitu-
tional failings of Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 if extended to its limit because of the necessity
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Justice Stewart dissented in Branzburg because of failure to con-
sider the " 'delicate and vulnerable' nature" of first amendment rights
for which "[tjhis Court has erected ... safeguards when government,
by legislative investigation or other investigative means, has attempted
to pierce the shield of privacy inherent in freedom of association."" 3
Lower courts consistently have narrowed Branzburg's language
and distinguished its holding.234 Adopting any of the Branzburg state-
ments of proper deference to first amendment interests, it must be
conceded that some burden shifts to the investigators if the investi-
gated have some first amendment claim. The Roe decision avoids this
burden-shifting by refusing to recognize the first amendment claim,
leaving the Connecticut mothers with no way to avoid the inquiry into
their private lives.
Roe thereby affords the Court the opportunity to develop the
scope of first amendment associational interests. Such interests should
not be limited to political or otherwise public concerns. 2as The privacy
element of family unit integrity compels a convincing showing by the
government to justify its investigation. The Court must determine
of having a neutral magistrate balance competing individual and societal interests);
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1971) (majority opin-
ion requiring neutral magistrate's approval of domestic wiretap of alleged subversives).
233. 408 U.S. at 725, 738. Justice Stewart would require that "the government must
not only show that the inquiry is of 'compelling and overriding importance' but it must
also 'convincingly' demonstrate that the investigation is 'substantially related' to the
information sought." Id. at 740. Justice Douglas' dissent was not even willing to weigh
the governmental interest He argued that "all of the 'balancing' was done by those who
wrote the Bill of Rights," id. at 713, and reprimanded The New York Times for conceding
such a balancing approach, id., as he had at oral argument in New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reported at 39 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. June 22, 1971).
234. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment Corp., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1959 (9th Cir. 1972);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). In
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. petition dismissed, 417 U.S. 936
(1974) inquiry of a journalist-defendant concerning eyewitnesses was allowed because it
went to the heart of the civil libel suit In so holding, however, Judge McCowan em-
phasized a case-by-case approach and stated that the "central thrust" of Justice \\lite's
Branzburg opinion was "the traditional importance of grand juries and the strong public
interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law." Id. at n. 6. He also noted that
Justice White relied on the protections available in the Branzburg context. Id. See
generally, Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and its Aftermath, 52 TExAs
L. REv. 829 (1974).
235. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he right to establish a home is an essential part of the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." See note 79 supra. See also United
States Dept. of Argiculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538-45 (1973) (Douglas, I., concur-
ring); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972) and, particularly, Justice Douglas' dissent at 179-80; NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963). See Privacy Sections I and III supra.
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whether, in the Roe context, the investigation is required by "the
course of justice.- 23 6
CONCLUSION
Connecticut has a history of unsuccessful attempts to intervene in
private family decisions. The state fought determinedly to prevent
birth control. 237 It went to the Supreme Court to keep indigent mar-
ried couples from divorce. 238 It sought to assure that a pregnant
mother would not have the option to have an abortion.23 9 The common
thread in all these efforts was a purported benevolent motivation: to
protect individuals from themselves and to enhance family life.
Again claiming a benevolent purpose, Connecticut substitutes a
legislative generalization for a private, parental decision in § 52-440(b).
The state presumes a mother does not know what is best for her
illegitimate child if she receives welfare. She faces a year in jail if she
refuses the state's advice that she publicly include the ieluctant father
in her child's family identity. Connecticut's forced disclosure statute
provides no individualized inquiry as to the child's best interest.
The state impinges directly upon the interests of a family, parent
and child, in determining their own destiny. Because the child is
illegitimate and the mother unwed, the state's paternalistic power,
cloaked in a parens patriae rationale, can separate them and jail one for
the other's own good. Alongside this "benevolent" policy is a more
mundane fiscal justification. There is appalling insensitivity to the deli-
cacy of the impoverished illegitimate's situation and the family's pri-
vacy interests. Illegitimate children are once again victimized by "a
236. 365 F. Supp. at 75, quoting WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2192 at 72 (McNaughton rev.
1961). The justification for compelling testimony is couched in terms of duty to society,
which may vitiate privacy rights when the course of justice so requires. However, the
course of justice is not implicated in Roe. As Justice Douglas recently noted, "A witness
is often permitted to retain exclusive custody of information where a contrary course
would jeopardize important liberties such as First Amendment guarantees." Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 65 (1972) (concurring) (recalcitrant witnesses could inquire
regarding wiretaps prior to answering questions before grand jury) citing In re Stolav, 401
U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
237. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
238. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
239. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), on remand from 452 F.2d
1121 and Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), vcacated, 410 U.S. 951
(1973), rehearings denied, 411 U.S. 940, conformed to 369 F. Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973).
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moral prejudice." 40 Those whose mothers are welfare recipients are
cursed by the burdens of inadequate funds, the stigma of welfare, and
the inevitable application of § 52-440(b). The Supreme Court could use
any of several constitutional doctrines to decide Roe. The Court may
further develop nascent doubts about parens patriae rationales per-
mitting deprivations of liberty and privacy. Moral outrage at the
illegitimate children of welfare recipients must not mask equal pro-
tection, due process and privacy violations precipitated by heavy-
handed intrusion into family life. The illegitimate child and unwed
mother have enough trouble; the state should wait to be asked to
intervene. It may be difficult to affix the proper constitutional labels,
but the spirit of the Constitution denies governmental authority in
matters of family definition, absent compelling reasons.
240. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,558 (Brennan, J. dissenting with Douglas, White
and Marshall, JJ.). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972),
Justice Powell argued for the 8-1 majority, "The status of illegitimacy has expressed
through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust."
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